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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POSSIBLE INTERMEDIARY ROLE IN CAMBODIA VIEWED

Paris LIBERATION in French 10 Aug 84 p 12

[Article by P.S.: "Cambodia: France As An Intermediary"]

[Text] "It is probable" that France "will be asked to play a larger and larger role in the search for a just solution to the Cambodian problem." This statement of Prince Sihanouk, president of the coalition of Democratic Kampuchea (fighting against the pro-Vietnamese regime of Phnom Penh) who recently completed a quasi-official visit to France, is not simply courtesy addressed to his host, minister of external relations Claude Cheysson. It seems that the position adopted by the French diplomatic service since the Vietnamese entry into Cambodia in 1979 has begun to bear fruit. The French government recognizes neither of the two "governments" who are contesting Cambodia (the coalition presided by Sihanouk, supported by China and the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, and the Phnom Penh government, supported by Vietnam, the USSR and Eastern Europe).

While reaffirming French "involvement" with Sihanouk and its refusal to recognize "a government imposed by a foreign force" (i.e., the Phnom Penh government installed by the Vietnamese army), Cheysson tried to begin to "normalize" relations between France and Phnom Penh. The Cambodian capital was visited at the end of July for the first time by a French parliamentary delegation and economic and cultural aid projects were mentioned at that time. A representative from Quai d'Orsay already met with the pro-Vietnamese side at the beginning of the year. The response of Phnom Penh's government to these overtures came through his minister of foreign affairs, Hun Sen, who told the French members of parliament that "Paris' role would be easily accepted by all the parties" interested in settling the question and he announced that his government would soon open an information bureau in Paris. The affirmation of French support for Sihanouk and this reconciliation with Phnom Penh are not as contradictory as might appear.

More and more often both sides state their desire to find a political solution for a crisis that cannot be solved militarily. Last 9 July, for example, Prince Sihanouk with the support of 6 ASEAN nations revived his "national reconciliation" project, which could possibly lead to a united government including all Cambodian factions. For its part, the Phnom Penh government made known that it no longer would exclude Prince Sihanouk and his prime minister, Son Sann, from playing a role in the future of Cambodia. The Soviet Union also seems to want to solve

the Cambodian situation. The Kremlin leaders, who recently received the pro-Vietnamese prime minister, Chan Si, insisted strongly on the need to "normalize" the situation in Southeast Asia (including their relation with China) by creating "an atmosphere of confidence, neighborliness and cooperation." It would probably be wrong to be too optimistic and the path to a solution promises to be a long one, because it must go through Moscow and Beijing. But Paris seems to be well placed to be an intermediary.

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CSO:3519/475

UDF GROUP FORMS 'GENERATION 86' TO PREPARE FOR ELECTIONS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 15 Aug 84 p 5

[Article by Sophie Huet: "'Generation 86,' Breeding Ground for the Parliamentary Elections"]

[Text] We are approaching the parliamentary elections of 1986...quickly, but in the dark! The election law is not known, the presidential campaign is far off, the organization of our political family, the UDF, is confused. The horizon is not clear." This is the rather pessimistic statement made by the young liberals who are now working in the field to get the UDF included in the parliamentary elections. Since there is strength in numbers they have decided to put together a "cooperative of candidates" to be called "Generation 86." This association conforms to the law of 1901 and it was announced on 5 July by its founders, both members of the UDF, Jean-Pierre Raffarin and Dominique Bussereau.

In 1 month "Generation 86" has started to organize. "The spirit behind our approach is clear," explained Jean-Pierre Raffarin. "We want to put together about 60 new liberal candidates for 1986 and fill in the gap between the RPR and the PSF. The UDF needs 1 year to redo its national image, decide on its candidates and set up a campaign strategy. It will not be completely finished until October 1985, in other words about 6 months before the elections. For the new candidates this intermediate year will be a difficult one. We will take the responsibility for making something happen."

Special Events on the Program

About 30 individuals have already joined "Generation 86," including Willy Dimiglio, county councillor of Herault, Simone Martin, European deputy and town councillor from Saint-Dizier, Francis Saint-Ellier, county councillor and assistant to the mayor of Caen, presidents of small businesses, an engineer from Control Data and even a philosophy professor who founded a private secondary institution in Paris.

Each month the members of "Generation 86" will meet for a working session. The first was held on 8 August with the topic of the opposition's image in the media; the second will be held on 24 September. During the three fall seminars, the association has invited in turn for lunch Messrs. Leotard, Ciscard and Barre. Also on the menu: talks about defense, new technologies, the institutions of the

"Sixth Republic" or perhaps discussions on the use of data processing in the parliamentary campaign or on the organization of special events, "the only wide-range activities that are self-financing," as emphasized by Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Two members of "Generation 86" will set the example in this respect: on 16 September, Francis Saint-Ellier will hold a "freedom party" in Calvados and Simone Martin, a "republic party" in Saint-Dizier, which Valery Giscard d'Estaing will attend. Aside from these two events, "Generation 86" will organize a "festival" program including general data applicable throughout the country.

This "cooperative of candidates" definitely wants to be "non-aligned." Dominique Bussereau thinks that it is entirely too soon to line up behind a potential candidate for the presidential election. Followers of Barre, Giscard or others will have complete freedom of movement within "Generation 86."

Marathon

There is a dual advantage to this structure: it will allow potential candidates to pool their finances and thereby organize activities with a wider scope, for example, purchasing computers or organizing "Christmas trees" featuring movie stars.

Worried about the way in which the audiovisual media are helping to "age" the opposition's image and to publicize only the most strident elements of the anti-Left, the members of "Generation 86" are trying to shake habits and to present to public opinion a less political and more open image of the future candidates. The latter have decided to campaign in their T-shirts in stadiums, in their jeans with their windsurfers, in short as "everyday" men who don't need to hide their hobbies. Didn't Francois Leotard, the deputy mayor of Frejus, set the tone by actively preparing for the New York marathon?

For these young liberals the most delicate thing will definitely be to get their candidates accepted for the last 100 meters of the campaign. "Generation 86" definitely intends to support its members all the way to the finish line.

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GREMETZ RECEIVES PARAGUAYAN POLITBURO MEMBER MAIDANA

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 7 Aug 84 p 6

[Text] At the invitation of the French Communist Party, Ananias Maidana, member of the politburo of the Paraguayan Communist Party, recently spent a few days in Paris. Accompanied by Livio Gonzales Santander, member of the central committee of his party, he held a long meeting with Maxime Gremetz, secretary of the PCF, and Georges Fournial, of the foreign policy section.

During their talks they exchanged substantial information on the political situation in France and in Paraguay, on the solidarity that traditionally unites the two parties, and on their common concerns: solidarity toward people in combat, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean; peace in Central America, threatened by the imperialism of the United States; and international detente and the struggle to stop the arms race in the world.

While the dictatorship that has oppressed his country for 30 years is facing a serious economic and political crisis and is trying to continue to exist under a false democratic facade, Ananias Maidana especially insisted on the Paraguayan Communist Party's appeal for unity in action, without excluding all the anti-dictatorial forces, for a provisional civilian and military government that would combine anti-imperialist, democratic and patriotic unity and would open the path to the wide-ranging reforms needed by the country.

This implies resisting the designs of the government of the United States, which has always upheld the regime of dictator General Alfredo Stroessner and which, like some international organizations, is trying to encourage a "restrained democracy" of the leaders of the "legal opposition" by compromising with the dictatorship.

Thanking the PCF for its constant solidarity, Ananias Maidana pointed out that the Paraguayan regime has not stopped its repression and that in this regard the names of the secretary general of the PCP, Antonio Maidana, who "disappeared" 4 years ago, and of Captian Napoleon Ortigoza, imprisoned for 22 years, are symbolic.

Maxime Gremetz, who in some detail explained to the Paraguayan delegation the new situation in France after the change in administrations and the policy of the PCF, assured him of French Communists' support for the struggles in Paraguay and for the PCP as it tries to end the dictatorship, to free all political prisoners, to clear up the fate of those who have disappeared and to install a democratic regime.

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FITERMAN DISCUSSES INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION, EMPLOYMENT

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 28 Jul 84 p 3

[Article: "Creating a New Hope: The Means Exist for Tackling the Employment Problem"]

[Text] Charles Fiterman, secretary of the Central Committee of the PCF [French Communist Party] came to Corsica for 2 days to take part in the campaign conducted by the island's Communists in view of the regional assembly election which will take place next 12 August. At morning's end yesterday he had a meeting with the population of Sartene along with the town mayor, Dominique Bucchini, who is also at the top of the PCF list for the regional ballot.

At this meeting, Dominique Bucchini recalled the action of Charles Fiterman as minister of transport who in particular made it possible to put an end to the threats against the existence of the Corsican railroad; having been integrated with the SNCF [French National Railway Company] together with its personnel, the railway today is on the way to real modernization.

Charles Fiterman stressed that "to vote Communist on 12 August is to vote for clarity, justice, progress and Corsica's future." The Communist leader (who will be speaking in Bastia tonight) gave an important speech in Ajaccio towards the end of yesterday afternoon before several hundred people.

Charles Fiterman, after calling to mind the reasons which led the Communists not to take part in the government which has just been formed, declared:

"This does not and will not lead us to any accommodation as far as the right is concerned. The leaders of the opposition, to be sure, are not missing the opportunity to weep and wail so as to capitalize on dissatisfaction of all kinds. What would they do with France? They have answered the question occasionally and the answer is only too plain. They are dreaming of revenge; they are dreaming of brutal social decline; they are dreaming of attacking every good thing that has been done since 1981, and they even think that the conditions will exist to call in question social rights and advantages won decades ago by those who live by their work." (...)

Corsica: The Misdeeds of the Right

Speaking of Corsica, he observed: "For years, these men of the past have favored luxury tourism, speculation in real estate over housing for young people, and ties with an unbalanced, seasonal economy. They have developed an unhealthy clientelism which goes against the dignity of Corsicans. And the outcome of this reasoning is that Corsicans, especially young people, will have no option other than to leave or remain unemployed and receive assistance." (...)

After stressing the desire of the Communists to "raise the barrier of the forces of progress" against the return of the right to management of the country's affairs, Charles Fiterman continued: "The question is, what is to be done? What can we hope for? I paid careful attention to the speech of the Prime Minister at the National Assembly. I say with no desire to criticize, with sincerity and concern: I do not think that the trends it revealed are capable of solving the country's problems.

"Of course we are in favor of modernizing, as we are in favor of giving greater impetus to research, training and investment. Those are excellent principles. But what sort of modernization is it that continues to close businesses, and to reduce activities that are modern? (...) Irreversible damage has been done. How can research, training and investment be developed with a budget which is actually a reduction in the financial effort made to those ends?

"It is true that the business sector, and plainly the increase of employers' profits, is being counted on for this. To be sure, businesses and the PME [General Confederation of Small and Medium Sized Businesses] must have the means to operate, invest, train, and do research. But frankly, are there not in this country other rights which merit the left's urgent attention besides the right...to profit?

"It is a mistake to believe that profit increases necessarily give rise to productive investment."

Charles Fiterman recalls that in 1983 gross profits increased by 17 percent whereas private investment continued to stagnate.

The Big Bosses Will Always Ask for More

"Make no mistake about it," he continued, "the big bosses will not be satisfied with what is promised or given, but will always ask for more. Under these conditions, how is it possible to get together?"

Noting that nearly 6 million voters of the left refrained from voting in the European elections and at the same time recalling that what was at stake, contrary to the claims of the right, was not to change the management of the country's affairs, he adds: "Is there not the risk in this situation, by persisting in going in the wrong direction, which they call 'austerity,' of seeing the hemorrhage get worse, of courting disaster?"

"We Communists do not want that, we have no desire to see it happen, and we say that the situation is not hopeless. Hope remains while a will exists, while it is still possible to act in order to be heard. We say that people must turn decisively and with confidence towards those who wanted change in 1981. The broken thread must be tied again, reconquest pursued, and for this the great goals approved by the country and which brought victory to the left must be reaffirmed; the necessary means, and new means if need be, must be defined and adopted. For it is true that the crisis is a profound one and the obstacles are many. This is but a further reason for consolidating the means and pushing ahead no matter what the cost. Towards what primary goals?"

Employment the Primary Goal

"Employment and work first." Emphasizing that in a country like ours millions of men and women unemployed is neither acceptable nor unavoidable, Charles Fiterman believes that "real modernization must create jobs at the same pace as it does away with them. It must create new qualifications, new jobs, must be accomplished with people, for them."

"In France, moreover, there are many areas where technical needs or investments may be made, and lines of production begun or developed. There is the reconquest of the home market which has been much discussed and which has not been achieved.... By capitalizing on our assets and acting intelligently, a selective revival can be brought about without provoking an explosion in imports; and to intelligence one may add steadfastness," he stressed, noting that we are one of the few countries where industrial protectionism is virtually nonexistent.

"It must be created, confronting aggressive and unfair competition. And that has nothing to do with a so-called protectionism which no one wants, at least not us." ...Charles Fiterman lists other means to be employed: a major effort in research and training, the restoration of schooling; the rearrangement of schedules, reducing some activities but preserving the income which families need by ensuring work efficiency. "Finally," he declared, "there is the need to continue the effort after justice because too many inequalities, too many injustices remain in our country. In particular, the buying power of wage earners and the income of farmers must be preserved, raised in some cases, because there must be people to buy if one wants to sell and work."

"They will tell us: for that you have to have money, the means." Charles Fiterman notes the very high cost of unemployment: "Would it not be possible, instead of paying people to keep them in tragic inactivity, to pay them to produce, to work in one way or another at activities useful to the country? It is worth thinking about."

"To the list of means, I would add fiscal reform, the establishment of a modern, just, and effective fiscal system (...)." Observing that one must also make better use of the possibilities created by the nationalization of the banking system and the large industrial groups, he concluded: "Here, we think, are the means of creating new hope, new drive, a new situation."

CGT YOUTH TO RELIEVE NICARAGUAN WORKERS FOR FIGHTING

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 7 Aug 84 p 6

[Text] Monday 10:30 am in Roissy: the conference room was filled to overflowing and all the faces were radiant. The 40 youths in the Daniel Ferry CGT group who were going to work in Nicaragua were there. Andre Deluchat, secretary of the CGT, Gilbert Julis, in charge of the international department of the confederation, the representatives of the federations and departmental unions, Mr. Corea, attache at the Nicaraguan embassy, parents, friends and many other youths who would have liked to have been part of the trip have come to say good-bye.

Patrick Minter, secretary of the CGT Confederal Center for Youth (CCJ), congratulated the young people who were going to do the work of young Nicaraguans while the latter go to the borders to defend the sovereignty of their country.

Rafael Corea greeted the delegation: "The most powerful government in the world wants to destroy my country and working youth wants to save it. Today you are the ambassadors from France to Nicaragua; upon your return you will be the ambassadors from Nicaragua to France."

All the noise died down; the room was attentive, aware of the importance of solidarity.

Deluchat then recalled the links that unite the CGT with the Sandinista Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers.

Among these enthusiastic, determined young people I met Gerard from Amiens, Michel from Nice and Carole from Grenoble, whose welder's helmet was falling out of the bag she was carrying.

"I am leaving for a country that has refused the bondage of the United States; I hope that Nicaragua's experience is successful and that it continues because it is the great fear of Washington. Now I am in a hurry to get there," confided Gerard from Finistere.

It is 12:30 pm; Gerard has not yet left Roissy but he is already in Nicaragua.

Other groups have gone there, such as the Communist Youth. They will be present at the Festival of Humanity where they will give witness to and participate in a great manifestation of solidarity.

U. S. "DANGERMONGERING" IN GSEE ISSUES CHARGED

Athens ENA in Greek 26 Jul 84 p 13

[Text] The Greek General Confederation of Labor (GSEE) has begun to be an object of "special" concern on the part of the United States and its labor-union movement, both because of the participation of communists in its administration, which is unprecedented and sensational for a labor organization of the "Western type," and also because of the initiatives which it is developing in the international sphere, which are already being looked upon with skepticism by the organization which the GSEE belongs to (the ICFTU).

The ICFTU is a focus for the non-communist national labor organizations, and it is essentially controlled and guided by the American labor unions.

From 1947 until 1981, government and labor-union elements from the United States "by tradition" used to guide, directly and indirectly, the course of the Greek trade-union movement and determine its foreign policy. Their present concern is due to the fact that from 1982 on the GSEE began to be in a certain way the "naughty child" of the Western unionist family of which it is formally a member. And the "naughty acts" of the GSEE which the Americans hint at concern not only the participation of the ESAK-S [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating] (the KKE) in the presiding body of the confederation, but also the foreign policy which the GSEE is following, which is characterized--according to the West--by undue overtures towards the socialist countries and their labor organizations. It is indicative that after the GSEE congress (December 1983) and the participation of the ESAK-S in its administration, the United States had expressed "apprehensions," via its labor representatives, about a possible "slipping" of the GSEE away from the Western labor-union family and towards the Eastern one, with the Americans coupling this participation of the ESAK-S with the more general policy which PASOK is following on international matters.

The "dangermongering" which the Americans are undertaking in connection with the ideological orientation and stance of the GSEE seems to fall within the more general framework of the "pressures" which the United States is exerting on the Greek government and which have a bearing on the positions taken by the latter on issues of international policy (missiles, and so forth). The fact that 20 days ago a government official on

international labor issues from the United States was in Athens and made informational contacts with the government and the GSEE for the purpose of ascertaining their intentions cannot be unrelated to the notion that in some way the GSEE is playing a "corrosive" role in terms of the cohesion of the Western labor front.

This attitude was obvious in the contacts made in Athens by the special assistant to the U. S. secretary of commerce on international labor affairs, A. Freeman, who met with both Minister of Labor Evang. Giannopoulos and also with the president of the GSEE, Giorgios Raftopoulos.

At the same time, the Americans seem to want to support that group of PASOK officers which is opposed to cooperation with the KKE at the labor-union level and which had disagreed with the choice made by the PASOK Executive Office on the substantive participation of the ESAK-S in the presiding body of the GSEE.

The spokesmen for this movement also made personal protests to the premier, with the backing of the general director of his political office, A. Livanis--who argued for an "anticommunist" course for PASOK--in order to torpedo any bipartisan cooperation at the GSEE level. This effort did not succeed, because ultimately the "collective presiding body" of the GSEE was formed by order of the Executive Office, which had raised the issue of "party discipline" among the party's unionists to get them to vote for the representatives of the ESAK-S.

The characteristic opposition of the latter to PASOK's income policy and the encouragement it gave to the winter strike mobilizations provided to this PASOK movement the opportunity to reestablish its line of argument against cooperation with the ESAK-S and to seek a "settlement" of the situation--that is, the replacement of the present GSEE presiding body with a new one which would be purely governmental.

For its own obvious reasons, the United States is trying to interpose itself in the rift which objectively exists on a governmental and labor union level in connection with the composition and the course of the GSEE. The United States wants to strengthen the "anticommunist" movement in PASOK and the PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] by using as its connection an officer of the GSEE presiding body who was and is against cooperation with the ESAK-S. This officer has had personal contacts with figures in the American embassy, who have "offered" to back him, even to "instruct" and "brief" him in the United States, behind the backs not only of the other GSEE administrative officers, but even of the PASOK Executive Office.

When these moves became known to PASOK, the restraining mechanism was mobilized and "explanations" were asked of the embassy about this "improper"--as it was characterized--intervention on its part in the internal affairs of the GSEE. The result of this was to "freeze" these practices, at least with respect to the open supporting of the anticommunist movement in the GSEE administration and the group in the government and party machinery which backs this movement. But this does

not mean that in the long run there will be a "freeze" also in the effort toward an ideological (anticommunist) waterproofing of the GSEE, an effort which is not unlikely to reach the point of supporting the creation of another GSEE with a Western orientation, as happened after all in Portugal and Tunisia. In these countries, when the "official" confederations passed under the control of leftist anti-Western forces, new ones were automatically created with the desired ideological orientation.

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CSO: 3521/327

PLEA MADE FOR CALM POLITICAL CLIMATE

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 25 Jul 84 p 8

[Text] Yesterday evening political leaders, deputies, and officials of parties and of public life more generally celebrated together cheerfully, in good spirits, with humor, and with a friendly attitude toward one another the 10 years since the restoration of democracy. Rightists, communists, socialists, and centrists found themselves in a warm and friendly atmosphere. Just as it always should be in democracies. Just as political leaders should always present themselves.

But our politicians must convey to their followers also this climate which they are experiencing in these pleasant receptions as well as daily in the hallways and lecture rooms of the Chamber of Deputies. Because it is not right, but much more than that it does not help the country, for our politicians, despite their conflicts, to be friends with each other and to converse in a very decorous atmosphere on the one hand, and on the other hand for their followers to be urged to hate each other.

All the people must be brought to understand that political confrontation does not mean a desire to destroy the adversary, whether morally, politically, or even physically. To understand that a political adversary does not mean a "mortal enemy." Just as the deputies of PASOK, of the New Democracy, and of the KKE can coexist peaceably, in a civilized way, and in a friendly spirit, so also the followers of the parties, of all the parties, must learn to constructively compete and even to cooperate with one another. Only in this way will our democracy move forward.

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CSO: 3521/327

EARLY ELECTIONS ISSUE: COMMENTS, OPINIONS

Reported Papandreou-Karamanlis Discussion

Athens ENA in Greek 26 Jul 84 p 10

/Text/ As soon as he was informed about the results of the latest Karamanlis-Papandreou meeting, a stylish minister, a trusted person in Kastri, hastened to announce, "it was a historic accommodation." And most probably he was right. Following the talks held at the Astera Hotel in Vouliagmeni, satisfaction in both the Presidential Mansion and in the Maximos Mansion was great as well as balanced. Perhaps the reasons for the satisfaction and the estimates of profits and losses are different. However, in the game of politics this is the rule and not the exception.

The "official report" of the talks is now being prepared after quite a delay because of the secrecy maintained on the meeting by both parties concerned. The fragmented information and an elaboration of all the data that ENA has gathered in connection with this important meeting make up the following picture:

The discussion centered primarily on three important political issues, all having a common ground: the timing of parliamentary elections, the electoral system and the presidential election of next April.

Beginning with the latter issue that is also the determining milestone of political developments, A. Papandreou, for the very first time placed his party's position before K. Karamanlis, assuring him officially that PASOK would support him in case he were to accept the candidacy for a renewal of his term of office as president. Of course, A. Papandreou's purpose was to be informed as of now on K. Karamanlis' intentions and to thus opportunely determine his own political tactics. The acceptance of his proposal by the current president would have been equivalent to a "green light" for the completion of PASOK's 4-year term of office. Correspondingly, a refusal would have obliged the prime minister to readjust his tactics by seeking another candidate or else speeding up elections since the present correlation of forces in the Chamber of Deputies does anything but guarantee the mustering of the increased majority of three-fifths (180 deputies) for the election of another --except K. Karamanlis--candidate. The president of the republic avoided any answer or commitment to A. Papandreou's proposal. He told the prime minister that he himself did not have any such ambition and only if he were to judge that his presence in the political life of the country was still indispensable would he accept his new proposal as a candidate. And for that

reason, he added, he could not decide at this moment since had to weigh the conditions and events that would have developed with the end of his term of office.

A. Papandreou rebutted that this abeyance would impede government planning given the fact that the presidential election could directly influence developments for a speedup of elections in case the present Chamber of Deputies were not able to elect a president.

At this point, according to ENA's available information, the prime minister played his most dangerous card: the speedup of elections. And it was played rather smartly. A. Papandreou invoked ND's arguments as the latter had been supported both during the voting for the constitutional regulations on the election of a president as well as during the election of K. Karamanlis in May 1980. In other words, the need to dissociate the election of a president from political disputes and to distance it from party affairs. In other --simpler--words, those who want Karamanlis as president must not be obligated to vote for ND...And the prime minister continued, "Would you, Mr President, have any objection if the government took the decision to ask for a speedup of elections?"

The answer could not, either from a theoretical or practical standpoint, be negative.

The two fellow-talkers and table companions had reached the dessert when the prime minister touched on the last issue: the electoral system.

He did this because in case the government had taken the initiative to recommend the holding of elections in the fall it could provoke surprise by violating its promise for the setting up of "the simple proportional representation system." From previous discussions the two leaders had found some common ground on this issue. In other words, that every concession made to the smaller parties must not upset the philosophy of the present system in the election of strong majorities and stable governments. At the same time, A. Papandreou had committed himself that any possible modification would not provoke a complete refusal by the major opposition party that could have abstained from the elections.

Of course, the existing system fits in with this common ground of the two political leaders, with perhaps one downgrading of the limit of the second round from 17 percent to 10-12 percent. However, any such thing takes away from PASOK any hope of its being self-supporting and makes the KKE a mediator.

Thus, the dual system, in one stage, is gaining ground in PASOK--especially after the results of the Euro-elections--according to which 200 deputies are elected with the simple proportional system and 100 are distributed to the two first parties at a ratio of 60:40 or 70:30.

If, finally, this system were to be promoted, PASOK appears to base, with hazardous certainty, its political future on the three percentage points that gave it supremacy on 17 June. Because the suit that it is sewing for parliamentary self-supportiveness also suits ND.....

Papandreou Faced With Dilemma

Athens ENA in Greek 26 Jul 84 p 17

/Article by P. Bakogiannis: "When Will the Elections be Held?"

/Text Once again "everybody" is talking about elections. Of course, Greeks quickly get tired of persons and situations while the electoral results do not justify any euphoria in any segment of the electorate. These are the familiar reasons why immediately after each election they talk about the next one and right after the formation of a government they talk about the reshuffle that is to follow.

To what, however, is the "talk about elections" due, especially in the past few days in the press, indeed, after the results of the 17 June elections that were "calming in nature" and also discouraging for all those who expected spectacular changes or triumphant renewal of popular confidence?

First of all, all Greeks know from experience that no one engaged in the political life of the country goes by the rules of the game. Nevertheless, discussion around the possibility of a speedup of elections for one additional reason is not unfounded: indeed, next May, i.e. 6 months before the term of office of the present Chamber of Deputies ends, the election of the new president of the republic must be held.

For its side, PASOK has tried to overcome this problem with the statement by A. Papandreou that his party would gladly vote for K. Karamanlis.

However, the current president of the republic did not wish to deliver the prime minister from his agony. He avoids divulging his thoughts and intentions, leaving it to be understood that he does not want to be elected with the present makeup of the Chamber of Deputies. This is so, as he contends, because he believes that "the president of the republic should not be a prisoner of any party." And K. Karamanlis, as it appears, believes that he would be a "prisoner" of PASOK since he could re-elected only if that party were to decide to give him its vote.

A. Papandreou, therefore, is faced with a dilemma: either to endanger the vote for the election of the president of the republic that would come from the ranks of his party with the support of the KKE or to move forward toward elections before May, at which time, according to the results of the elections, he would determine his posture.

In the first case, he runs two dangers: either he would not succeed in electing a president since it is a known fact that he cannot control 10-12 of his deputies, with the result that the Chamber of Deputies would be dissolved and the next elections would inevitably take on the nature of a plebiscite for K. Karamanlis, or he would elect his own president, with the result that he would lose a large segment of his moderate voters in the fall 1985 elections, those moderate voters who had voted for Change under the great surveillance, however, of K. Karamanlis.

K. Karamanlis plays a most significant role in our national life. A role that is not given only by the conservative wing. Elections, consequently, in relation to the time of the election of the president of the republic or linked with the person who will be elected are not advantageous at all to PASOK since it is not certain how a large segment of its voters would respond to the dilemma.

If A. Papandreou finally decides to move forward toward elections from next May, then the best time will unquestionably be the fall. There are many reasons for this: In November, he must announce the new income policy --the winter months are always difficult ones and are associated with an increase in unemployment. Generally-speaking, an improvement in the economic situation is not expected --following elections American policy always becomes less flexible vis-a-vis Greece. There is also New Democracy that in the present situation in which it finds itself will find it difficult to lay claim to first place.

There is, of course, another possibility that cannot be excluded during the discussions that are being conducted on "talk about elections." The prime minister himself might want to be elected president of the republic next May. This cannot be excluded.

Such a decision, however, contains two essential dangers: the first is that A. Papandreou might not be elected with the present doubtful majority he has, something that would mean the end of his political career. The second danger is that with his possible withdrawal from PASOK's leadership his party would not even be able to win the fall 1985 elections and there would also be the immediate danger that the party would be dissolved.

The logical consequence of the above is that if PASOK wants to overcome the obstacle of May 1985 it has no other choice but having recourse to elections next fall.

If, in summary, we wanted to weigh the possibilities of developments we would give the following percentages for our estimates: 70 percent elections will be held between October and December, 20 percent between January and April and only 10 percent in the fall of 1985.

K. Karamanlis is, therefore, once again the "Key" to political developments at the end of the decade after the changeover of regimes. The way he will ponder over his role will mean much and not only for immediate political developments.

Disapproval Expressed

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 5-6 Aug 84 p 9

/Editorial: "The Job Must be Completed"/

/Text/ Indications are increasing daily that Mr Papandreou is making preparations for a recourse to elections in the fall. There are much data that reveal such preparations and the estimates of the "pro" and "con" that advocate the speedup of elections are very "logical" --from PASOK's standpoint.

The postponement of necessary increases in prices of goods and services in the public sector and the announcement of projects that are certain not to be carried out are offered as two of the classic governmental actions for the creation of a favorable pre-electoral atmosphere.

The increase in the price of liquid fuels, for example, that had been officially announced for this year has been postponed despite the fact that the deficit, in drachmas, of the state budget from the import of petroleum products had been

overextended because of the increase in the value of the dollar, while the budget is completely unable to correspond to obligations incurred. Planned public works projects have been abandoned because of the lack of capital just as, for the same reason, employees salaries, housing loans, income tax returns, etc. etc. are being delayed or "put off."

A more elementary financial responsibility suggested an increase in state revenues so as to prevent an accumulation of deficits and unrealized obligations whose covering becomes more difficult as time passes. Exactly the opposite tactics cannot be suggested except from political and party expediency "of complete precedence" alone.

This same kind of collapse is being observed in all the other national "accounts." A desperate attempt for the purchase of Iranian petroleum that would cover the needs of the last quarter through the export of Greek products --an unknown quantity at depreciated prices-- was made necessary because of the dramatic lack of foreign currency. Bank of Greece officials have provided information to the effect that we have become obligated in paying an overall sum of 400,000 dollars in fines to our petroleum suppliers because we have been behind in the receipt of shipments since we did not have the foreign currency to pay for them!

The continued drop in our foreign currency revenues will inevitably aggravate the situation in imports from abroad with the result --besides all the others-- that inflation would be speeded up because a more rapid devaluation of the drachma against all other foreign currencies would be presented as the sole "solution" for confronting the currency impasse.

Mr Papandreou has no doubt that the social and psychological atmosphere in the next year will be shaped by the aggravated economic conditions. To prevent their effects --effects that are much more negative because of the fact that the waste of an entire 4-year period no longer permits putting the blame "elsewhere," i.e. on the policy of previous governments--he is speeding up elections.

The PASOK leader reckons that expectations for a better government is surviving in a large segment of his 1981 voters in comparison with those of the "Right," although the continuous fluctuations of the "Movement's" relations with the West or with private initiative result in maintaining confusion over his genuine "ideological" intentions.

Mr Papandreou is still "counting on" some favorable result in the electoral outcome of New Democracy before it succeeds in settling the critical problems --organizational and planning-- that now raise many contrary opinions as far as its readiness is concerned when succeeding PASOK to regain the ground that we lost in all fields of endeavor from its administration.

Finally, the prime minister reckons that with the renewal of "confidence" of the electorate he would overcome the obstacles that the need for the election of a president of the republic next April is creating for him, while the danger of an additional decrease of his electoral percentage would deprive him later on of every opportunity in forming a government. Cooperation with the KKE is not such a simple matter. The precedent in France was altogether different. There, the socialists did not need the communist votes in the Chamber of deputies, and, moreover, France does not participate in the military wing of NATO.....

Mr Papandreou has repeatedly proclaimed that he does not see any reason for holding elections prior to the end of the constitutional term of office. Neither do we see any reason for that. Not because the execution of the "successful" government task must not be interrupted. But because Greek citizens must, when they go to the ballot boxes, have a complete picture of the consequences of this "task," as well as the abilities of the political party that is their responsible "execution." As of now, they have not been sufficiently informed on either one or the other. Consequently, the prime minister is obligated to respect his proclamations!

5671

CSO: 3521/328

ALLEGED DISMISSAL OF GOVERNMENT FIGURES AS SCAPEGOATS

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 27 Jul 84 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] By means of two moves, Papandreou will be trying to lessen the public's discontent and to mollify inner-party elements which have been reacting negatively to him.

The first move involves the replacing of ministers and deputy ministers, in yet another attempt by Papandreou to present his administration as having a "new look" through promising to conduct a shake-up within it. The other move has to do with the two-day session of the PASOK Central Committee, which begins tomorrow. And this move aims to prevent the manifesting of a sharp inner-party opposition.

More specifically, reports are that as part of the reshuffling which he will carry out around the end of August--as the AKROPOLIS published a few days ago--Papandreou will replace Minister of Commerce Kedikoglou, Minister of Physical Planning Tritsis, and probably also Minister of Communications Akritidis.

Charges

Kedikoglou is accused of having opened up a "battle front" with the producing classes; moreover, he has not managed to avoid price rises for basic necessity goods, with the result that the governing faction is incurring a tremendous political cost.

Tritsis is charged with having launched himself, without specific objectives, into a many-sided undertaking which has led to disturbances on such a scale as to have damaged the governing faction also.

At the same time Papandreou is also displeased with him for the specific reason, as the AKROPOLIS published last Sunday, that he has done nothing substantial to deal with the pollution of the environment in the capital area, the result being that he has been relieved of the responsibilities in this sector by the diplomatic expedient of assigning the coordinating of the relevant effort to Tsokhatzopoulos.

The probable replacement of Akritidis, assuming it takes place, should be ascribed to his inability to deal effectively with communications problems

or to avert strike actions, the most characteristic of which are those of Olympic Airlines and the trolley.

These strikes have subjected the public to much hardship, and the displeasure of the public over this weighs adversely on the government.

Also Deputy Ministers

Reports by certain government sources that the minister of technology and research will be replaced as well are not confirmed by other sources.

At the same time, Papandreou is also thinking of replacing many deputy ministers, some of these because he has decided that they have not been effective, and others in order to appoint certain malcontents to these posts so as to satisfy them.

According to reports, among the deputy ministers which the premier is thinking of replacing are I. Floros, deputy minister of health; P. Moralis and S. Papatthemelis, deputy ministers of education; D. Dimosthenopoulos, deputy minister of finance; M. Papaioannou, deputy minister of the interior; I. Valyrakis and K. Aslanis, deputy ministers of communications; and probably also S. Giotas, deputy minister of agriculture.

With these extensive changes in the composition of the government, Papandreou will be aiming to soften the public's displeasure over the incompetence of this administration.

Papandreou will be having discussions with Alevras on the issue of this shake-up of the administration in the course of their vacation at Kerkyra during the first two weeks of August.

Following his return from Kerkyra, Papandreou will discuss this reshuffling also with Gennimatas and Tsokhatzopoulos.

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CSO: 3521/327

GOVERNMENT INTRODUCES BILL ON SECURITY CORPS UNIFICATION

Bill Provisions Listed

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Aug 84 pp 1, 3

[Text] Minister of Public Order, Mr. Skoularikis, yesterday introduced in the Chamber of Deputies a bill with which the organizational structure of the ministry of Public Order is modified and the unification of the security corps is in effect realized. The bill's first articles involve the general structure of the ministry and clearly provide for the creation of a police service with the title of "Greek Police," with jurisdiction over the entire country except for the areas for which special regulations provide for the jurisdiction of the Port Corps.

The Greek Police constitutes a separate armed corps, functions with its own organizational laws and the regulations concerning civilian civil servants are not applicable for its personnel. The personnel of the Greek Police has a military rank structure and discipline and is kept in a continuous state of readiness for the prevention and control of crime, the safeguarding of the democratic regime and law and order and the management of special needs in accordance with the laws and directives of the government elected by the people.

The personnel of the Greek Police will be trained in the use of weapons, special instruments and machines and at the schools and training centers of the Armed Forces.

Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 define the branches of the Greek Police concerned with law and order, security, civil defense and administrative support. More specifically, these articles regard the structure, the duties and the work in general of these branches.

Article 8 of the bill provides for the constitution of a police directorate in every Nome and its structure. For the Attiki and Salonica Nomes there are established a General Police Directorate with directorates for law and order, security, traffic, administrative support and police precincts for law and order, security, traffic and market police.

Services for the security of the president of the republic, the Chamber of Deputies and the premier will be instituted within the Directorate of Security of the Attiki General Police Directorate.

Article 9 defines the duties of the municipal police who are part of the Nome Police Directorate force and serve in municipalities and townships. Article 10 provides for the constitution of a Nome Police Commission whose membership will consist of the Nome prefect as chairman, a representative of the Local Union of Municipalities and Townships and the police chief.

The jurisdictional responsibilities of the Nome Police Commission will consist of the adoption of measures in especially significant situations of danger for the disturbance of law and order by rallies, fires and other extraordinary needs of the Nome and proposals to the ministry of Public Order for better organization and operation of its services in the Nome. To this effect, the commission will accept and study reports from all Nome agencies or other authorized collective representations of the Nome.

Article 11 defines the organization and operation of police services, while Article 12 regulates various matters which concern the control of the operation of public centers, etc., the prerequisites for granting permits for the operation of private detective agencies, and the protection of morals and minors. It will also provide for the issuance by the Chief of the Greek Police of police ordinances for crime prevention, the maintenance of law and order and the protection of minors.

Other Jurisdictional Responsibilities

Article 13 defines the terms of the duties of the public prosecutor. Article 14 defines the police procedures for misdemeanors and Article 15, the conditions for guarding prisoners.

Article 16 covers public accountants, while Article 17 provides for the creation of Military Police detachments from personnel of the Greek Police during a state of war. The same article defines the composition of these detachments and their duties.

Article 18 touches upon the relations of the Greek Police with the judiciary and other authorities. More specifically, in Paragraph 2, it is mandated that the services of the ministry of Public Order perform only the duties connected with their mission and they do not serve papers in civil litigations, etc.

Article 19 defines the expenditures and the means of operation of the Greek Police. Article 20 defines the categories of expenditures and Article 21, the operation of clubs and exchanges of the Greek Police.

Article 22 defines the categories and distribution of the personnel of the Greek Police. There are four categories: Police personnel; Municipal Police (Township Police); civilian personnel and Firefighting personnel.

Article 23 defines the organizational positions of the Police personnel, which are: Lieutenant Generals, 5; Major Generals, 21; Police Chiefs, 125; Deputy Police Chiefs, 250; Police Inspectors 1st Class, 450; Police Inspectors 2nd Class, 802; Captains, 1,623; Police Lieutenants-Master Sergeants, 6,800 and Policemen, 27,966. Temporarily, and as long as they are in service, the officers who were promoted or will be promoted in accordance with the provisions

of Law 649/70 there are created two positions of Police Inspector 1st Class; 62 of Police Inspector 2nd Class; and 376 Captains. Women may compose up to 10 percent of the organizational positions of policemen and master sergeants. Also specified are the positions of the health service personnel (Police Veterinarians, 22; 11 police chiefs; 20 deputy chiefs or inspectors and one captain); band personnel (three police chiefs or inspectors, three captains or lieutenants, 45 second lieutenants-master sergeants and 15 policemen).

Article 24 defines the ranks of the Greek Police and Article 25, the age limits by rank. More specifically, the Lieutenant General-Chief's age limit is 62 years; Lieutenant Generals up to 61; Major Generals, 60; Police Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs, up to 58; Inspectors, up to 57; and Captains and policemen, up to 55 years. The municipal policemen may serve until age 65. Temporarily, and as long as they remain in service with the Greek Police, for those who transfer from the Gendarmerie and Cities Police, the age limit, beginning with the rank of Captain on down, is established as follows: Captain, 54; warrant officer, 52; and master sergeant and policemen, 51 years.

The Various Branches

Article 26 define the branches of the civilian personnel and the municipal policemen and Article 27, the sources for policemen and master sergeants. More specifically, this article provides that one-half of the enlistees be veterans and for all to be between 18 and 26 years of age and to have completed high school or another accredited school.

Articles 28 and 29 provide for the sources for warrant officers and their advancement in rank. Article 30, the sources for officers.

Article 32 regards administration and specifies, among other things, that only the minister of Public Order, the secretary general of the ministry and the responsible ranking personnel of the Greek Police and Fire Corps have disciplinary jurisdiction over the personnel of the Greek Police and the Fire Corps.

Article 33 establishes that the chief of the Greek Police be a Lieutenant General of the Police. The heads of the four branches also have the rank of Lieutenant General as well as the position of deputy chief. The Major Generals are assigned positions as regional inspectors, directors general and directors of Central Services. The chiefs of police directorates hold the rank of police chief or deputy chief.

Article 34 regard the specific obligations of the personnel of the Greek Police and Article 35 establishes a mandatory service of 8 years for policemen and 10 years for lieutenants. Article 36 establishes that the remuneration of the personnel of the Greek Police be the same as that of the military. The same article covers the cases of withholdings or reductions in pay. Article 37 covers per diem expenses, special conditions allowances and Article 38, health care. Article 39 establishes material and moral rewards and Article 40, the accountability of police personnel.

Article 41 provides for the establishment of a police academy and Articles 42

and 43, the specific cases for the training of personnel. Article 44 specifies the procedure for the selection of chief and the lieutenant generals, Article 45 establishes the regular and special fitness evaluations of officers, Article 46, the procedure and Article 47, the commissions of evaluation of policemen, master sergeants and warrant officers. Article 48 defines the special conditions for promotion, Article 49, the conditions for transfers and Article 50, the detachment and transfers.

The remaining articles of the bill cover the disciplinary measures, the regulations for the personnel of the ministry of Public Order, the abolishment of the Cities Police and Gendarmerie, the conditions for transfer of the two abolished corps to the Greek Police, the establishment of seniority, the equivalency of enlistment, the selection of locations of the Greek Police, the special conditions for transfer, the insuring of the personnel and the handling of pending matters.

Unfavorable Reactions

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Aug 84 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] Yesterday, while the minister of Public Order, Mr. Giannis Skoularikis, made statements in which he reiterated that the totality of the Security Corps' personnel is in favor of the unification, a pall of sorrow and gloom prevailed at the Cities Police because of the introduction of the bill. In private conversations officers and lower cadres expressed total displeasure with the government's intention to make the Police Corps subject to the Gendarmerie. In the meantime, the Gendarmerie Corps also expresses its opposition to the bill.

From what can be deduced from these conversations, it is not to be excluded that should the government get the bill passed it may find itself faced with the unpleasant surprise of the refusal of a large part of the Cities Police personnel to transfer into the new Police corps. Such intentions were expressed yesterday, not only by top and high ranking officers, but by lower cadres as well who maintain that the provision that no post transfer may take place for the first 5 years after the establishment of the new police corps is, in essence, worthless in view of the fact that it contains a proviso that a post transfer can be effected within the 5-year period for disciplinary reasons, etc.

As far as the Gendarmerie is concerned, there were no reactions expressed yesterday and, from all appearances, the personnel of the second police corps being abolished expects to make a complete review of the provisions of the bill before taking a definitive position on it. In any event, the Gendarmerie Corps as well is not in favor of unification despite the fact that under this bill it will have some advantages over the Cities Police.

The Port Corps

Prior to the introduction of the bill there had been rumors that the Port Corps was among the corps to be abolished. There had actually been such an intention on the part of the government. However, it was not pushed because the reactions that would have ensued would have strengthened the antagonism of those opposed to

the Police and Gendarmerie and would have ended by having a negative result on the unification of at least these two corps,

Objective observers, who have reviewed the provisions of the new bill, noted that although it is an improvement over the one proposed unofficially a few months ago by the government to test the waters, nevertheless it does not eliminate its intentions to create a purely military body, with military hierarchy, military structure, military discipline, modern armament and training capable of military operations which would be mainly subject to the minister of Public Order in office at the time--all the officers would be mere window dressing--and secondly to the Nome prefects and insignificant representatives of the local self-government organizations.

The New Democracy

The Political Council of the New Democracy meets this morning with the bill for the unification of the security corps as the only topic for discussion. The convening of the Political Council was decided yesterday after the leader of the ND, Mr. E. Averof, got in touch with Mr. Kon. Papakonstandinou, who will chair the meeting.

The ND's opposition to the unification of the security corps is given as certain, while the urgent convening of the Political Council prior to Mr. Averof's return from Kerkyra is typical of the desire of the official opposition to give an immediate political answer to the government on this matter.

New Democracy Opposition

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 23 Aug 84 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] Yesterday, the official opposition accused the government because, with the unification of the security corps, it is attempting to create an open climate of partisanship which threatens the individual and social liberties. The New Democracy connects the introduction of the bill pertaining to the unification in the Chamber of Deputies to the forthcoming parliamentary elections, the failure of PASOK in the Euro-elections and the extensive operation of reprisals against civil service employees who are subjected to transfers en masse since the day following the Euro-elections.

The aforementioned extremely serious accusations by the ND were contained in a statement issued by the party's Political Council, which met yesterday morning and discussed the subject of the unification of the security corps exclusively.

The minister of Public Order, Mr. I. Skoularikis, paid no attention whatsoever to the very serious accusations of the official opposition by limiting himself to a statement that the bill is acceptable to the personnel of the security corps and to public opinion and that he will give a detailed answer during the debate that will take place in the Chamber of Deputies.

The assurances of the minister, however, are contradicted by a statement made by the Panhellenic Association of Retired Cities Police Officers in which the very serious reproach was made that dictators attempted to abolish the present system of policing, which is the fruit of democratic concepts.

The meeting took place at the request of ND's leader, Mr. Averof, under the chairmanship of Mr. Kon. Papakonstandinou.

The communique issued by the Political Council of the ND is set forth below:

"The bill for the unification of the security corps, which, after 35 months of hesitations, was suddenly introduced by the government (unbeknownst to the responsible minister) in view of the forthcoming elections, constitutes a continuation of the attempt to create a climate of partisanship in the state machinery and the imposition of totalitarian systems. It is perhaps the most naked intervention in the most sensitive sector of the administration connected with individual rights, the freedom of thought and the democratic parliamentary institutions.

"With this bill:

"1. The minister of Public Order acquires absolute military power to make decisions, regardless of the constitutional dictates and judicial guarantees, for what is permissible or not permissible, for political expressions, for rallies and the expression of individual and political rights of the citizens. The interpretation of the terms 'security' and 'public order' will lie within his irrevocable judgment.

"2. While the bill is being presented as a bill to realize the unification of the corps, regardless of the soundness of the idea, it creates a separate police corps with dangerously undefined duties, subject to municipalities and townships. It is, as a matter of fact, a party civil guard. With this measure it is attempted to revive an institution that was abolished decades ago at the urging of all political parties as being dangerous to the liberties of the citizens."

Subject to Nome Authorities

"3. It subjects the police force of every Nome to the orders of a Nome commission composed of the party-faithful Nome prefect, a representative of the local self-government and the police chief of the area. The purpose of the commission is to order interventions 'in particularly significant cases of a threat of disturbing or the actual disturbance of law and order by gatherings and meetings' or in cases of special need, without asking the opinion of the district attorney and with the right of arbitrary interpretation of all these terms, by the party governor, the prefect of the Nome. It should be noted that it is also the task of the commission to impose on the corps anything the minister of Public Order has commanded. No district attorney and no constitutional guarantees.

"4. It completely militarizes the security corps in order to obtain easily their obedience to the party machinery. One may wonder how the minister of Public Order will be able to reconcile the absolute military discipline with the police labor unions that were introduced when the threats of the defeat of the party, which is now seeking support by oppressive means, were not perceivable.

"5. The legal status of those serving in the corps, despite the apparent concessions, becomes worse because the transfers, relocations, placements and promotions are made with no guarantees. However, above all it is sought, with many

regulations, to force the officers and men to resign in order to pave the way for impatient party patronage.

"The New Democracy is totally opposed to the bill, which at least should have been submitted for study by all the members of the Chamber of Deputies. The Greek people note that this bill is being introduced after the failure of PASOK in the recent elections and as a result of an extensive campaign of reprisals against the civil servants and employees of public organizations who are being forced to transfer in great numbers.

"The New Democracy condemns the partisan brazenness of the PASOK government and especially when it has, in essence, lost the majority of the people. It states that it will vote against the bill and that soon, when it comes to power, it will fully reinstate the non-partisan operation of the administration and the free application of the democratic institutions."

Politicization of Corps Claimed

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 24 Aug 84 p 5

[Excerpts] Has Mr. Papandreou ever asked himself why we have come to the point where we do not have any true law enforcement? Has the premier ever tried to find out how much sense of security the average citizen feels? Has he ever asked to read the full weekend police blotter in order to have an idea to what degree the forces that exist for that specific purpose, that is, the police and the gendarmerie, protect the citizen, his property and security? Has he ever sought to see, with his own eyes, through the security ring that surrounds him during his coming and goings, whether there are any policemen on the street other than the very few traffic policemen at the most central points?

Let the premier not entertain any doubt whatsoever that the real reason for this unacceptable and extremely dangerous situation is to be found nowhere else but in the politicization, in the effort of all the governments to convert the security corps into executive organs of their policy, an effort in which PASOK has surpassed all the others, thus disproving by this as everywhere else the touted "contract with the people" in which it promised a "politically neutral security corps."

What do the premier and his party say now? Will they learn anything from the situation or will they continue along the same path, insisting on the bill they introduced for the unification of the security corps and paying no attention to the total objections of the official opposition?

Let Mr. Papandreou and PASOK be assured that if they do this they are not going to add anything either to the power of their regime or to the prestige and job of the security corps nor to democracy and its future, which is connected to the future of the country.

The security corps are not health centers nor smog to be used as a means of demagoguery by PASOK's propaganda machine. They are very substantial elements of democracy and our society with a significant place and a very active role in our recent history, and will also surely play a very important role in what

is going to follow. It is time, therefore, for everyone to recognize this and to stop hindering them and using them almost as party pawns.

If Mr. Papandreou and his party desire that the situation continue, let them insist on their one-sided bill; they have every possibility to make it a state law with the numerical superiority of their deputies; however, in the long-run, it will not be profitable to them as all party machinations, this one as well will turn against its creators as soon as they find themselves out of power; it will offer the successors to our present administrators all the ready-made means and forms they will also need to create their own police regime without taking the blame.

All this does not mean that changes in the security corps are not needed; perhaps many and substantial ones are needed. But they cannot be made unilaterally. Inter-party cooperation is needed.

It is necessary for PASOK to perceive at some time that there are problems that cannot be solved by the will and power of only one party, no matter which it may be.

9731

CSO: 3521/336

BRIEFS

GRANTS TO POLITICAL PARTIES--The sum of 500 million drachmas will be divided up among the parties for the current year, on the basis of the provisions of Law 1443/1984 concerning "financial support for the political parties." The relevant decision, which was signed yesterday by Minister of the Interior Ag. Koutsogiorgas, provides for the following distribution of government assistance: PASOK will receive the sum of 236,323,386 drachmas (two hundred thirty six million, three hundred twenty three thousand, three hundred eighty six). The KKE will get the sum of sixty million, two hundred and six thousand [sic], seven hundred and twenty nine drachmas (60,406,729). The Democratic Union of the Center will get the sum of 8,333,333 drachmas. The same sum, 8,333,333 drachmas--will be received also by the parties EDA [United Democratic Left] and the KKE-Interior. The minister of the interior stated yesterday in speaking to journalists that the sum of 1 billion drachmas was not given to the parties because "there were extensive expenses incurred in holding the elections." In any case the minister of the interior admitted, in answer to a relevant question, that the monies which have been divided up among the parties are extremely small in comparison to the amounts which they have spent and the needs which they have. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Aug 84 p 1] 12114

CSO: 3521/327

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IN POLLS DROPS 10 PERCENT IN 3 MONTHS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Aug 84 pp 72, 4

[Text] In a recent opinion poll, conducted by Hagvangur, Inc, in July, 58 percent of the respondents indicated support for the government. Support was higher among men than women. Support for the government has dropped from 69.6 percent in April of this year to 58 percent in July, according to the poll. To the question, "Do you support or do you not support our current government?", 12.7 percent of the respondents declined to state their preference, while last April only 7.9 percent indicated that they did not know the answer. In the current poll, 26.5 percent indicated opposition to the government, compared with 20.5 percent in April.

This diminishing support for the government is in accordance with shifting trends in support for the various political parties, according to opinion polls conducted by Hagvangur, Inc. The statistics indicating support for individual parties were published in MORGUNBLADID last Saturday. The polls show that the government enjoys the support of the majority of the people; a total of 57.2 percent of the voters supported the Independence Party and the Progressive Party at the polls in April of 1983. Of those who took positions relative to specific parties in the Hagvangur poll this time, 48.8 percent preferred the Independence Party (which received 38.7 percent of the votes in the 1983 elections), and 14.7 percent preferred the Progressive Party (which received 18.5 percent of the votes in the election).

It is worth noting that the government received considerably more support among men than among women, according to the Hagvangur statistics. Of men, 64.9 percent indicated support for the government (compared with 75.9 percent in April of this year), but only 50.4 percent of women indicated support (compared with 63.3 percent in April). There was also greater support for the government indicated in sparsely populated areas (61.2 percent, compared with 73.4 percent in April) than in densely populated areas (59.3 percent, compared with 73 percent in April). Government support figures for the Reykjavik area came out to 56.7 percent (66.7 percent in April).

This current Hagvangur opinion poll was conducted between 6 June and 18 July 1984. The sample included 100 persons from all over Iceland, and the poll was conducted over the telephone. The percentage of gross response was 78 percent, and net response 83.5 percent. Respondents in the poll were eighteen years of age or older. They were selected randomly from the census records kept by the University of Iceland's Statistics Department, with permission of the Icelandic Economic Bureau and Computer Department.

We have printed the results below of the respondents' answers to the following question: "Do you support or do you not support the current government?" All figures are percentages. For purposes of comparison, we have also printed the results from the similar poll conducted by Hagvangur, Inc, in April, 1984.

Do you support or do you not support our current government?
 July 1984 April 1984

Support	58.0	69.0
Do not support	26.5	20.5
Don't know	12.7	7.9
<u>Refuse to answer</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.0</u>

	Men		Women	
	Jul '84	Apr '84	Jul '84	Apr '84
Support	64.9	75.9	50.4	63.3
Do not support	24.2	16.9	29.1	24.0
Don't know	8.2	5.6	17.6	10.3
<u>Refuse to answer</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>1.6</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.4</u>

	Reykjavik area		Dense population		Sparse population	
	Jul '84	Apr '84	Jul '84	Apr '84	Jul '84	Apr '84
Support	56.7	66.7	59.3	73.0	61.2	73.4
Do not support	29.2	23.6	24.4	17.4	20.0	14.7
Don't know	11.1	8.4	14.0	7.5	15.3	7.3
<u>Refuse to answer</u>	<u>3.0</u>	<u>1.3</u>	<u>2.3</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>4.6</u>

AUGUST SEEN AS CRITICAL ELECTORAL STRATEGY MONTH

Madrid ABC in Spanish 2 Aug 84 p 17

[Text] Madrid. The political parties consider August to be decisive for finalizing their strategies for the upcoming political confrontation which is of paramount importance from the point of view of the next general elections. Among the decisions which the announcements on a motion of censure and of the crisis in the cabinet.

According to comments made to ABC by opposition spokesmen, their strategy to gain ground can no longer be any other than resolute and frontal attacks on government actions, including the use of censure which they say should be measured out carefully and employed only at the most opportune moment. Because of the mechanics governing this parliamentary procedure--the presentation of an alternate candidate and the defense of a government program--the "wearing down" tactic can turn against the one who uses it. For this reason it can work only in moments of government weakness. From the point of view of strategic plans, the aim of the opposition is, thus, first to bring about that "weakening" and then to take advantage of it. To accomplish this, they do not rule out, as an opportune moment for the offensive, the end of the debate on the state of the nation set for September and an "institutionalized" repetition of last year's debate.

The arguments of the opposition will focus primarily on the failure to carry out the socialist economic program. This question has been raised bit by bit over a period of many weeks by the leader of the opposition during the question period in the plenary sessions of the Congress of Deputies. Manuel Fraga will especially castigate the failure to create 800,000 jobs during this legislative period. This is considered by the majority of the critics of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party [PSOE] to be its worst error.

Socialist spokesmen have informed ABC that the government's counterattack will be none other than the cabinet crisis which has been postponed as long as possible so as to produce the desired effect. For Prime Minister Gonzalez it will be a question of projecting the image of a "renewal" of government promises. This would be "a face-lift" for the government which has become somewhat worn down since the midpoint of its term in office and has behind it a party which must be pacified as much as possible during its next congress.

Both political forces--the government and the opposition--have to protect their flanks with regard to their parties. The wearing down of the government is detected in a relative gaining of ground by the critical minorities led by Pablo Castellano which, although they have displayed little aggressiveness in the party congress, have not stopped upholding, as far as possible, the "essentials" of socialism as against the inconstancy of the Social Democrats. In this sense, Madrid is a warning to the party officials that they must persuade the rank and file to accept some of their strategic moves.

Felipe Gonzalez, who is now going on vacation, away from the political hustle and bustle, has the final say but around him there are internal confrontations--such as that between party strongman Alfonso Guerra, and "economic vice premier" Miguel Boyer--which require more and more decisive arbitration among his followers.

Ferrer Salat y Roca

When the Popular Coalition forms for the next political confrontation, the role of Ferrer Salat may be decisive to the extent that he gains strength within the party, which does not preclude a certain amount of convulsion among the "historic" supporters of the alliance who have had to make a hard "crossing of the desert."

Fraga, besides holding talks with Oscar Alzaga, must still reach a decision on Miguel Roca's reform proposal which will also be brought up during this decisive August. Up to now, Roca is moving ahead with the international ratification of his proposal as fast as he is losing ground with regard to the possibility of strengthening his party in the short term, so that it might be a feasible option in 1986, due to Suarez' obstinacy in refusing to stage a "de facto coup" which would have entailed an alliance with the reformers.

The next few months will also be the last ones in which it will be possible to organize political forces outside the framework of the existing parties.

9204

CSO: 3548/309

JAUREGUI DENIES MODIFICATION OF 'GUERNICA STATUTE'

Madrid ABC in Spanish 2 Aug 84 p 17

[Text] Vitoria. The government representative in the Basque Country, Ramon Jauregui, yesterday told ABC, "It is not true that the national government will modify the Guernica Statute," thus contradicting statements on this subject by Joseba Arregui, spokesman for the Basque Government. In like manner, Jauregui justified the government stand on the Moncloa-Ajuria Enea relationship with regard to the constitutional requirement for inter-territorial solidarity.

Concerning the statements of Arregui, Jauregui stated, "It is untrue that the national government is going to modify the statute on autonomy. What it wants is to adjust realistically and with justice and solidarity the contribution made by the autonomous Basque community to the general budget of the state."

According to Ramon Jauregui, any statement on this matter which differs from this one, whoever may make it, "is intentionally loaded with bad faith."

According to the government representative, Madrid "will always respect the Autonomy Statute and the Harmonization Law" but he emphasized that "there is also a constitutional requirement, for nondiscrimination and inter-territorial solidarity." In this regard he stressed in particular the importance of the fact that "the Basque government knows that in compliance with the statute and the Harmonization Law, certain changes are also necessary in its overall system of contribution to the general obligations of the state."

On the other hand, Julem Guimon, president of the Political Committee of the Popular Coalition of the Basque Country and secretary general of the Peoples' Democratic Party described the attitude of the central government as an attempt to change the nature of the meaning of harmonization. He said, "To retain the new investments within the competence of the state is to change the nature of the meaning of Economic Harmonization."

STYMIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM BLAMED ON LACK OF AUTOMATION

Madrid YA in Spanish 6 Aug 84 p 4

[Interview with Salvador Dominguez, president judge of Madrid, by Carlos Fonseca: "Justice Continues with Its Ancestral Slowness Because Technology Has Not Reached It"; date and place not given]

[Text] Automation of the judicial branch and the future of the judicial profession are the two topics that most concern Salvador Dominguez, veteran judge of Madrid. He said: "In spite of the fact that the minister has said it is a question of work and dedication by the judge, the truth is that we lack information systems which we have asked for. We want to have the means of an average business. The administration of justice continues with its ancestral slowness because current technology has not even halfway reached it."

Salvador Dominguez, a 64-year-old Madrid native from Chamberi, is married and has five children. He considers himself a "receptive person who tried to listen to all the people and avoid politicization in his work." With almost 40 years in the judicial profession, he especially remembers two cases he has heard since October 1946 when he gave his first decision in Cabra del Santo Cristo, Jaen Province. The first was the cave-in of a plaza on the day of his inauguration which left 800 victims. About 10 years later there was the catastrophe of a 12-story building that collapsed in Almeria, trapping 20 workers.

[Question] What is your opinion of the bill passed at the last Council of Ministers concerning unopposed access to the judicial profession?

[Answer] The judicial profession today is not profitable compared to other professions like the practice of law. What is attempted with the fourth shift involves an underlying objective of politicizing justice, not filling the vacancies generated. If they are not filled, it is because there is no reason. Mediocre people chosen more for their militancy than their training can enter the judicial profession with that bill.

[Question] In recent months there has been much talk of citizen insecurity and the ineffectiveness of the police and the Ministry of Justice.

[Answer] Insecurity has been generated by amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law which implement, casually speaking, a line under which there cannot be a

prison sentence. Therefore, we have minor crimes committed by criminals who have a string of past crimes. It would be necessary to evaluate the danger of that person and decree prison, asking for bond.

[Question] There have also been enough police and judicial errors that have meant that innocent people have gone to jail. There is the case of young Hernansaez who was accused of the murder of a jeweler or the known criminal Kung-Fu who was also blamed for a crime that he did not commit. Aren't these cases examples of that ineffectiveness I mentioned?

[Answer] Mistakes occur because the investigation is presented with unreliable testimony. The judge acts on statements by witnesses who can perjure themselves. These are mistakes induced by the evidence given.

[Question] That means that perhaps the police do not give the judge the evidence they should.

[Answer] The police can be overwhelmed sometimes with an accumulation of proceedings and evidence. It is possible that, because of this, the evidence they give the judge is not what is desired. Keep in mind that Madrid has the highest crime rate in Spain and each judge decides a daily average of 250 cases.

7717

CSO: 3548/314

BASQUE LEADER RAPS MADRID, WANTS SECURITY FORCES REMOVED

Madrid ABC in Spanish 6 Aug 84 p 9

[Article by Carlos Olave]

[Text] Yesterday, during a ceremony to mark the opening of new PNV [Basque National Party] offices in the town of Orio, province of Guipuzcoa, the "lendakari" Carlos Garaicoechea delivered a harsh criticism of the government's policy regarding the question of autonomy and called for the removal of the State Security Forces. Speaking to an audience of more than 100 people, Garaicoechea returned again on his wellknown arguments in favor of full implementation of the Statute of Autonomy and launched a strong attack against the government's delegate.

"We feel that we are a nation," he said. "We can accept the existence of a supranational structure--be it called state or Europe--providing that it allows to maintain our individuality. But if that supranatural structure demands that we sacrifice our own identity as a nation or if we are again put in a situation where we are asked to show solidarity with the other nationalities while we are ostricized and we are denied the minimum tools required for self-government and to preserve our character as a nation, then we will reject that supranational Basque [as printed] structure."

Expounding on his criticism of the national government, Carlos Garaicoechea asked the following question: "With the laws now being enacted in Madrid, which completely violate the statute, do we have the means to organize our collective life and to direct the future of our people in those spheres that will allow us to survive as of a direct the future of our people in those spheres that will allow us to survive as a nation?" And his answer was: "Absolutely not. And this is not because the statute is inadequate but because we are being blatantly cheated." "Let nobody from Herri Betasuna or from any other political party claim that the fact that we are calling for observances of the statute indicates that the status is not a good instrument," the "lendakari" added, because "the opposite is true."

Gradual Withdrawal

But the strongest cheers from the audience came when Carlos Garaicoechea mentioned the withdrawal of the Civil Guard and of the National Police Force from the Basque country. "We cannot agree, even if we have our own Autonomous Police Force," he said, "with the idea that this autonomous police be a parallel force and that there will be no gradual withdrawal of the State Security Forces. That is a vindication of our people." On that subject he also said: "That process to justify the existence of the Autonomous Police allowing it to assume functions would result in a legitimate interpretation of the Statute of Autonomy. I don't care if Mr Barrionuevo, or whoever happens to be the Spanish minister of interior at any given time, says that the Civil Guard or the National Police will never be removed and I am not saying this out of any special feeling of animosity toward these forces. We must be magnanimous with regard to past events and forget what these forces have meant for this country. It is not a matter of resentment but of a nation exercising its right and coming of age."

Criticism of the Government's Delegate

Carlos Garaicoechea also launched a strong criticism of the government's delegate, Ramon Jauregui, who in a recent statement had claimed that the contributions made by the Basque people to the Spanish state lacked solidarity and were inadequate. "He is a Basque," Garaicoechea said, "and this is particularly distressing for me. He is fully entitled to consider himself a Spaniard, his feelings are his own business. But he is a native of the Basque country and it is not right that he should use the privileged position of his office to say that the Basque people did not contribute substantially."

Finally, he questioned the efficiency of the government's delegate and of civilian governors if it is a fact that the transfer of most responsibilities has taken place.

8796

CSO: 3548/313

GARAICOECHEA COMMENTS LABELED ULTRANATIONALIST

Madrid ABC in Spanish 6 Aug 84 p 11

[Text] The ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] finally seems to be with its back to the wall--thanks to sufficient police pressure in the Basque provinces, to a new attitude of cooperation from France and to open collaboration from Interpol. Those Basque nationalists who had used ETA as an unacknowledged tool to promote their policies are dismayed.

In Orrio yesterday, "lendakari" Garaicoechea dropped the mask of ambiguity which he had worn until now to conceal his true face and adopted positions that could amount to a violation of the Constitution and that show him taking radical separatist stances comparable to the positions exclusively held by the extreme left nationalists, members of Euskadito Ezkerra and Herri Batasuna.

After what Carlos Garaicoechea said in Orrio yesterday, one can easily understand his previous remarks denouncing the extradition measures against Basque separatists, measures which he described as "harassing," and the fact that he hailed the terrorists as being members of the nationalist "talent pool." All this was consistent with the dropping of the mask of the "lendakari" who was born in Navarra but claims to be a Basque when it suits him.

Nothing in the Statute of Autonomy, nor in the Constitution of which that statute is a part since it evolves from the autonomy options included in the constitution allows either the ascertainment that the Basque country is a nation which will only accept coming under a future supranational European structure, or the demand that the National Police Force and the Civil Guard leave the Basque provinces nor does it justify the rude treatment of Ramon Jauregui, the government's delegate, because he feels that he is a Spaniard. None of this can be tolerated but it all can and must be analyzed. Politically, it is more than unseemly to say that "we are ostricized and denied the minimum tools for self-government to pressure our character as a nation"...or to state that "the progressive and gradual withdrawal of the state security forces is a demand of our people." The people who voted for the Basque Nationalist Party [PNV] certainly did not give to Carlos Garaicoechea a mandate including the authority to change the course of the PNV and directing it to political positions held by Herri Batasuna.

How could the majority of the electorate who cast their vote for the PNV believing that it represented a useful alternative to the socialism of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and to the leftist policies of the Herri Batasuna and other groups, how could they give a mandate, expect or predict that Garaicoechea would suddenly change sides adopting radical positions as soon as ETA went into an irreversible dive?

The "lendakari"'s decision to reveal his true face and go over to the other side abandoning the ambiguity which had been until now the guideline of his strategy can only be explained if one realizes that the irreversible fall of ETA completely changes the political balance in the Basque provinces. The pacification of the Basque country by eliminating the Basque separatist terrorism will immediately change the political balance and the electoral scene. It is the only explanation for the change of course made by the PNV faction headed by Garaicoechea who gives the impression of preferring an objective alliance with the terrorist radical faction rather than political understanding with forces close to the center and the right. For many years ETA has served as the great alibi to justify some attitudes of some PNV's sectors. Now that ETA has its back against the wall the alibi is destroyed and everything becomes clearer.

8796

CSO: 3548/313

PROFILE, POLITICAL VIEWS OF AP'S EDUARDO BUENO

Madrid ABC in Spanish 6 Aug 84 p 17

[Interview with Eduardo Bueno, AP leader in Catalonia, by Enrique Serbeto:
"Eduardo Bueno: 'Fraga Is the Only Politician with the Rank of Statesman'";
date and place not given]

[Text] Eduardo Bueno, at 44 years of age, is one of the hottest politicians in Catalonia. His presence in the autonomous elections held last April was the biggest news. His rise to the top of the AP [Popular Alliance] in Catalonia is almost undisputed. He is a professionally successful man, a "self-made man" in the purest sense. His main secret, he claims, "is good work."

His biography follows a trite model used in cliches. The son of a poor couple, he spent most of his childhood in an orphanage doing agricultural work until he could go out on his own. He was "always working and giving up many things."

[Question] When did you decide to devote yourself to politics?

[Answer] It was an option to try to change things that I did not like in politics. In this country the most common tendency has been to criticize politicians as a whole. I also want to demonstrate that not all politicians are bad just because they are politicians. There can be good results from business experience applied to political activities.

[Question] Are you aware that you are committed to a very difficult position in a party that has greater electoral competition in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain?

Autonomism of the AP

[Answer] Certainly. There is the false impression that the AP is not autonomist. To prove that this is not true would require a great effort. I was born in Catalonia, I married in Catalonia and I live in Catalonia. I do not agree that any party has the exclusive franchise on Catalanism. Maybe some people who represented the party before gave that false impression of a lack of Catalanism but that is something we want to overcome. As to competition

by Convergencia on the conservative side, that remains to be seen. The voters will eventually realize that Convergencia has two parallel programs. In 1983 the Catalan minority voted with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] in 54 percent of the votes in Congress, even on such important issues as abortion and decriminalization of drugs. Later in Catalonia they said other much more radical things. That is something that has not benefitted Catalonia in view of the results of the Gonzalez-Pujol meeting.

[Question] The Banca Catalana lawsuit had an influence on this meeting. Do you think that this topic is going to be a factor during the entire Catalan legislature?

[Answer] It has already had a major effect but we hope that the Ministry of Justice will act as fast as possible. It is obvious that this sword of Damocles hanging over his head is not the right framework so that Pujol can administer Catalonia or make the best decisions. It is also obvious that it does not favor dialogue with the government.

[Question] Do you think that Pujol should leave his post at least during the trial?

[Answer] I think Pujol has his own advisers. If he has not made a decision, it is because he also has a clear conscience. I don't think it is necessary to resign merely because there is a lawsuit. It would not be consistent, especially in Catalonia where they are so frequent. The myopia of the socialists cannot be measured in diopters. A lawsuit is always untimely but this occurred at the worst possible time.

PDP and Democratic Union

[Question] The AP forms a coalition with the PDP [People's Democratic Party] which, in turn, has better relations with the Christian democrats in the Democratic Union of Catalonia, allied with Jordi Pujol. What could be the result of this combination of forces?

[Answer] I know that there have been serious disagreements for some time between Convergencia and the Democratic Union--for example, the vote by the Catalan Minority in favor of the abortion law. The ideal comrades for the Christian democrats of the Democratic Union are the Christian democrats of the PDP because I think they are national rather than nationalist and much more practical than the extreme nationalists. I am sure that the Democratic Union considers Spain with the Common Market closer and 38 million inhabitants and will not want to limit itself to only 6 million.

[Question] Isn't that the way to leave Convergencia with a larger and clearer margin to promote the Roca operation?

[Answer] The person or party that tries to divide the center or the center-right is doing bad service to the country. There are brilliant parliamentarians and Roca is one. There are messianic men with a great deal of charisma like Pujol. There are politically "attractive" men like Adolfo Suarez.

However, I only recognize Manuel Fraga as a true statesman. A legislative pact between the AP and some nationalist parties would be one thing. Anything else seems crazy to me and not beneficial for Spain because that space is Fraga's.

Personal Success

[Question] What factors have favored your personal success in politics?

[Answer] I think I have brought a little novelty. I like different styles, more personal politics. I do not like rallies because they only serve to strengthen the militants. I think it is necessary that the people know you because, otherwise, they tend to measure all politicians with the same yardstick when things do not go well. I have worked hard to travel to all the corners of Catalonia during the campaign. I have promised to visit them again during the legislature because I want to thank those who voted for me for their support and, especially, show them what I am doing so that they know me personally.

[Question] How dependent is the AP in Catalonia on the party leadership?

[Answer] The situation is one of total independence. This is one of the things we try to make clear. The favorable vote on Pujol's investiture cost us criticism from other sectors, even from a senator like Ricardo de la Cierva who then wrote a very harsh article. However, we felt it was necessary to end the tendency of Catalonia to vote one way in municipal elections, another in the autonomous elections and a third way in the general elections in order to strengthen our electoral plans. We want our true political space reflected in all of them.

7717

CSO: 3548/314

PARTY PROVINCIAL STRUCTURE SPARKS MP RIFTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Aug 84 pp 1,8

[Article by Canan Koker "The Provincial Quarrel Within The ANAP"]

[Text] Ankara - Work on the decree with the force of law on reorganizing the provincial network of ministries and related organizations was halted after pressures from the ANAP [Motherland Party] network were intensified. When the pressures went as far as the Minister of Transportation, Veysel Atasoy, work on reorganizing provincial networks was postponed for a while. Since the period during which the government can issue decrees has expired, provincial reforms will have to be made later, in the course of the coming year, in the form of draft laws. The views of local organizations and of deputies will be taken into consideration in drafting the provincial reforms.

According to the information obtained, work on reorganizing provincial networks, which was carried out by officials of the Premier's Cabinet under the presidency of Mehmet Kececiler, the assistant to the leader of the ANAP who is responsible for the party's organizations, was interrupted because of the protests and the intensive pressures originating from the provincial networks.

To begin with, when it was projected to decrease the number of regional offices attached to the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry And Village Affairs and to transfer the Regional Directorate of the YSE [Highways, Water And Electric Affairs] which is in Elazig to Malatya, the deputies Naci Tasel and Mehmet Ozdemir threatened to resign and demanded that the decree be changed. Subsequently the Minister of Transportation and Zonguldak deputy Veysel Atasoy also opposed the transfer of the Regional Forestry Directorate from Zonguldak to Kastamonu and he tendered his resignation to Premier Ozal in order to have the decree rescinded.

The hundreds of telegrams which came to the party headquarters from the ANAP provincial networks criticized the decision to transfer the YSE Regional Center which is in Elazig to Malatya because Premier Turgut Ozal and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Village Affairs, Husnu Dogan, come from Malatya.

They Decided Against Resigning

The Elazig deputies, Naci Tasel and Mehmet Ozdemir, who were prepared to resign were summoned to the ANAP Central Headquarters. Mehmet Ozdemir who had a series

of meetings with the assistant to the leader of the ANAP, Mehmet Kececiler, was persuaded to decide against resigning.

The Minister of Transportation, Veysel Atasoy, also conferred with Premier Turgut Ozal and when Ozal promised Atasoy that the decree would be changed the minister decided against resigning.

Kececiler Opposes

Members of the Elazig ANAP network and local mayors, together with the Elazig deputies, had come the day before to the ANAP central headquarters to meet with party officials.

According to information obtained, Mehmet Kececiler explained to Naci Tasel and Mehmet Ozdemir, who had decided to tender their resignation, that the decree was aimed at "creating a provincial network that would bring faster solutions to the citizens' problems." Kececiler opposed their pleas on the grounds that the reorganization of provincial networks was of a piece, that the boundaries of 38 regional organizations overlapped, that there were almost 50 organizations which were part of the regional network and that their numbers had to be revised.

The Elazig deputies and provincial representatives who could not reach an agreement with Kececiler, met after 20.00 hours in the Premier's offices. The Elazig ANAP deputy Mehmet Ozdemir, the provincial governor, Ali Yucel Uygur, the mayor of Elazig, Mustafa Temizer and sundry artisans' and craftsmen's representatives and provincial mayors conferred there with the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Village Affairs, Husnu Dogan.

At the meeting, Husnu Dogan pointed out that his ministry had issued the decree to transfer the YSE Regional Directorate from Elazig to Malatya and asked them to "show understanding" toward the decree, within the framework of the projected program.

At that point a message from Premier Ozal informed the meeting that the decree would be reviewed and it was learned that he had said: "I am rescinding the decree, which I would not have done had I not been from Malatya."

On the other hand, Premier Turgut Ozal declared, in reply to claims about unrest and tensions in the ANAP organization prior to the congress, "No one is restless within our organization."

According to an ANKA [Ankara News Agency] news item, Ozal does not share the view publicized in the press that "There is unrest in the ANAP organization" and he stated that no one was restless. When a journalist asked him whether or not the Minister of Transportation Atasoy had resigned he retorted: "There is no question of a resignation from the honorable Atasoy."

12278

CSO: 3554/302

OVERVIEW OF LEFT'S INTRAPARTY POLITICAL MOVES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Aug 84 pp 1,8

[Article by Yalcin Dogan "Left Makes Preparations For September"]

[Text] Ankara - While the Populist party is looking for a "new chairman", the SODEP [Socialist Democratic Party] is getting ready to appoint a "shadow cabinet." On the other hand, it appears that the founding of the Democratic Left Party has been left in suspension until February or March of the coming year.

It would be possible to summarize with those 3 sentences the activities of the 3 parties of the Left "during the hot summer months." But what is going on in greater detail?

The following view has prevailed in the capital for some time: according to the view which spread even more widely after the Bulent Ecevit - Aydin Gurkan meeting, "the stance of the parties of the Left, their merging and developments along those lines are dependent on the Populist Party's congress which is scheduled for February or March." What sort of congress will the HP [Populist Party] hold, with what kind of cadres will it emerge from that congress? When the race for the leadership within the HP is added to the foregoing, from the standpoint of a merger and of a reevaluation of the SODEP, the HP congress suddenly acquires "a determining character with regard to the situation in the Left..." from the angle "of creating, not an opposition, but the potential for an opposition" with its 116 deputies in the Assembly...

Because of its previous showing in the Assembly, the opposition pleased only the party in power. Even the HP was not happy with its own opposition in the Assembly.

A certain number of HP high level officials have focused all their strength and calculations on the "chairmanship" at this point. The remainder is constituted by those whose stance toward the DSP and the SODEP will become clear after the election of a chairman.

At this stage there is an interesting development in connection with the DSP. DSP officials are declaring that: "It is possible that the party will be founded in February or March of 1985 and work in this direction has been suspended until that time." And a preeminent personality of the DSP stated, in the exact words, the following as a justification:

"Our followers are the workers and peasants. We were the last to send out recruiting forms to the workers and peasants. But according to our information

those forms do not always reach the workers and peasants. We are now striving to get those forms into their hands. After being filled out, the forms will come to Ankara. And after that the party's program and regulations will be debated by correspondence. All this takes time. We are making no special effort to wait for the HP congress or to make the founding of the DSP coincide with the HP congress. But no one can deny that the HP, with its 116 deputies in the Assembly, is a power that cannot be underestimated."

Members of the HP cannot stop themselves from wondering about "how to get together with the DSP." There are those who, looking at the DSP and the SODEP, view the present chairman Necdet Calp as an "obstacle." But the number of those who say "This cannot be done without Calp," is not negligible either. The prevailing view is that: "From a congress to which one goes with Calp the party still emerges with Calp."

At any rate, the DSP is in no great hurry to be founded. And it sees no great need for any rush. The members of the Central Decision-Making And Administrative Committee which was established during the SODEP's congress that took place last month, evaluate this stance as "chances for the founding of the DSP being slight." And their argument is the following:

"As long as the DSP is not founded, it will be able to keep its identity alive. But once it is founded it will lose its vitality. That is why, according to them, the later it is founded the better. The fact remains that they will probably be unable to found the party."

The SODEP which evaluates the DSP in this way does not follow very closely at this point developments in the HP. But concentrates on its search for a way to create an "influential opposition." For an influential opposition, the MKYK [Central Decision-Making And Administrative Committee] members of the SODEP are now scattered among the various committees which are being established at this stage: committees such as those on workers' problems, cultural matters, economic issues, which are being set up now and will later act as a "shadow cabinet."

Well, must one wait then for a "shadow cabinet" in order to have an influential opposition? That seems to be the case. Because the newly elected members of the SODEP Central Decision-Making and Administrative Committee are in favor of following a "more dynamic and bolder policy." Whereas executives of the party favor a position along the lines of "slightly reining in." If a "shadow cabinet" is founded, the party executives and the members of the MKYK might be able to reach "a better understanding" among themselves.

It looks like the hot summer days will not last as long as anticipated. It appears that political winds will blow "earlier" from the capital.

12278
CSO: 3554/302

CIVIL DEFENSE SHELTERS NOT FULLY OPERATIONAL

Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 10 Aug 84 p 7

[Text] In case of a nuclear crisis situation, Austria's population would not be sufficiently protected. This fact is apparent from the recently published scientific study of the Seibersdorf Research Center in Lower Austria. According to the study, only 5 percent of the 350,000 Austrian nuclear shelters would provide the possibility of surviving a nuclear war for any length of time. Most of these facilities show not only a lack of emergency supplies, medications, sleeping accommodations and the necessary protective equipment; 15 percent of them show construction deficiencies as well--the shelters do not provide sufficient protection against radiation effects. In an interview with the IBF press agency, Professor Dr Herbert Sorantin, chief of the radiation protection department in Seibersdorf, stated that shelters must be of "seamless" construction, i.e., poured in a single piece and externally covered to be able to prevent the entry of radioactive particles. In actual fact, several constructions contain individual elements which are joined with mortar, which is permeable. Several shelters are made "leaky" also by running pipe and cable conduits through the walls. Experts determined in recent inspections that shelters exist for only 3 percent of the Austrian population. Says Professor Sorantin: "A law has been in effect since 1968 which provides that public buildings must have shelters; but that is not sufficient." Under contract with the Ministry for Construction and Technology, the Seibersdorf scientists are currently conducting research on air supply filtering in radiation protective shelters. Findings indicate that sand is an excellent filtering material. According to Professor Sorantin, it not only offers the best resistance against heat and blast waves, but also removes up to 95 percent of radioactive aerosols (droplets) from the air pumped in from outside.

9273

CSO: 3620/406

FINANCIAL BONUSES TO EASE MILITIA MANPOWER SHORTAGES

Brussels LE SOIR in French 8 Aug 84 p 2

[Article by Guy Duplat]

[Text] Our army has a shortage of soldiers. And to fill the holes, the ministers, within the framework of the 1985 budget, have decided to offer sufficiently large financial incentives to persuade many young militiamen to "reenlist" for 3 to 6 months. About 500 million francs have been allocated to assure the success of this operation "charm." This reform is in force for 2 years pending a more fundamental reform of the militia laws.

Our army is going to be confronted by a cruel manpower shortage. The drop in birth rate, combined with many exemptions from military services, are going to punch huge holes in the draft. What is more, budgetary constraints are preventing the Ministry of National Defense from making another appeal to career volunteers. And, since in the final analysis, we cannot change the duties and responsibilities of our armed forces without long and delicate negotiations--which remain to be conducted--with NATO authorities, we are confronted by a serious problem. In 1985, there will be 2,000 military specialty vacancies in the army. And projections indicate that after 1986 this military specialty deficit could reach 5,000, if not 8,000.

To bring about an in-depth resolution of this problem, we know that the joint Interior and National Defense parliamentary committees in the next 2 years will have to study a reform of the militia laws. Many voices have been raised in condemnation of the discriminatory nature of the present system. Counting young women, we know that only one youth out of four performs military service. That is tantamount to saying that only 25 percent of the population has to pay the state a heavy tax equal to about 1 year's wages.

While awaiting this reform, the government has adopted a temporary 2-year solution based on the voluntary extension of military service. Future militiamen will be able to sign up for a 3-month extension of their service at the time they are processed at the recruitment and selection center, that is, the "Petit Chateau." Therefore, they do not have to await the start of their

service to decide to extend it. They have to sign up before starting their service. But if they have signed up for a 3-month extension and after starting service wish to extend it further, they will be able to sign up for an additional 3 months (that is 6 months longer than the period of service of "regular" militiamen); however, they must do this during the first 6 months of their service. Not later.

No More Waiting Period

Since flies are not caught with vinegar, incentives have been provided to attract young people to these extended periods of service. First, there is a measure which concerns unemployment benefits after their demobilization. They will be permitted to enjoy unemployment benefits as soon as they leave the army. This is a useful measure, as statistics show that 42 percent of militiamen are unemployed when they join the army.

But these volunteer reenlistment militiamen will also have financial advantages.

During their normal service they will receive double pay (for them their pay will be increased from 75 to 150 francs per day during the first 6 months and will rise from 100 to 200 francs per day beginning with the 7th month). This, of course, is in addition to their retention of fringe benefits (housing, food, clothing, etc.). During the 3-month extension period, they will also receive 12,300 francs per month (that is,) (the equivalent of the unemployment benefits allowance), which will give them total pay of 18,000 francs per month. And if they finally extend their service another 3 months, for this second extension they will receive total monthly pay of 20,000 francs net, while retaining their fringe benefits. •

The cost of these incentives will be about 500 million francs per year. The base pay will be taken care of by the Ministry of Employment but the double pay and the supplement of the last 3 years will be the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense.

This reform is in force for 1985 and 1986. Will it still be applicable to the militia candidates for the 1985 draft who will be called up by the Petit Chateau on 16 September? We still do not know. For the moment, the General Staff is busy translating budgetary allocations into operational orders. These operational orders should also specify the military specialties which preferentially will be filled by these "extended" militiamen. It is possible that they will be assigned to specialties generally filled by 2-year volunteers.

8143

CSO: 3619/87

MILITARY

GREECE

KEED MEETING ON MILITARY ISSUES

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 25 Jul 84 p 2

[Text] The demand of the democratic, working-class, and youth movement for an army in the service of the people, so that democracy can enter into the barracks, played a dominant role at the event on behalf of young people serving in the military which was organized by the municipality of Kallithea in cooperation with the local branch of the KEED [Special Forces Training Center].

Those present at this event, which was held in observation of the passage of 10 years since the change in government, included the mayor of Kallithea, G. Gallos, and members of the Panhellenic Council of the movement. In speaking at the event--which was attended by over 1,000 persons--the chairman of the KEED, retired Brigadier General Spyros Sermakezis, stressed the need to radically reform the new military regulations and to have a substantial democratization in the army.

The need for every municipality to organize events for young people serving in the military was noted in his statement to the RIZOSPASTIS by the chairman of the KEED, S. Sermakezis, who characteristically stressed: "There must be widespread enlightenment throughout the community about the things which need to change today in the army, which for years now has been a blind tool in the hands of the reactionaries and the oligarchy."

12114

CSO: 3521/326

BO-105'S TRANSSHIPPED BY CASA TO IRAQ

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 5 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] The Spanish aeronautical enterprise Casa has supplied Iraq at least a dozen German "BO-105" helicopters made by the German company MBB [Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Bloehm], according to the Munich newspaper SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG yesterday. The newspaper added that the majority of the planes are equipped with "Hot" antitank missiles made by the French-German firm Euromissile. MBB owns 50 percent of this firm.

A small part of the helicopters were declared to be civilian transportation equipment although 20-millimeter guns from the Swiss enterprise Oerlikon-Buehrle were later placed under the cabins.

The helicopters supplied to Iraq and equipped with "Hot" missiles are equivalent to the "Pat-1" antitank planes that the FRG Army uses.

The French firm Sfim supplied the fire-control system to Spain where the helicopters were assembled with parts mostly from the FRG.

Fritz Gensch, spokesman for MBB, does not deny that "BO-105" helicopters equipped with armaments have been sent to Iraq although "that negotiation was never developed by our company."

Gensch added that "the negotiation has been investigated by the Ministry of Defense. It has the results of the investigation."

He also recognized that MBB will soon deliver half a dozen "BK-117" helicopters to Iraq for the transportation of government members. The internal transformation of these planes into luxury vehicles will be done in Austria.

SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG also revealed that MBB opened a special office in London a year ago to sell its products, avoiding the export limitations of the FRG Government.

Apparently it is not denied that contacts have been made with Iran, according to information from arms experts.

The last German war helicopters supplied to Iraq also left from Spain in 1981. They had been assembled by Casa.

NAVAL RENOVATION URGED TO REVIVE COMBAT STRENGTH

Madrid EL ALCAZAR in Spanish 5 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] The planned decommissioning of warships up to 1990 totals 57,240 tons compared to the 29,930 tons that will go into service during that period. Navy sources revealed to EFE that this concerns the Spanish Navy.

The tonnage that will go into service by 1990 includes the latest "Galerna" submarines of the 70 series, the "Principe de Asturias" aircraft carrier and the "FFG" frigates.

To achieve a balanced naval force, it is also necessary to have other forces like the support units that will help the combat group remain at sea, the sources added.

They stated that the construction of a mixed supply ship is urgent since the only oil tanker the Navy has is about to be decommissioned after almost 30 years of uninterrupted service.

Top Navy commands have expressed alarm at the fact that a total of 100,230 tons will be decommissioned starting in 1990 and continuing for 5 years. This will mean the complete disappearance of the destroyers.

According to what Navy specialists told EFE, the decision to renovate this force must be made before 1986 since it takes a minimum of 8 years to go from the concept of a ship to its operation.

The destroyers fulfill vital missions like protecting or escorting maritime traffic. The ships in the amphibious force provide speed and flexibility for landings.

As to future plans for the acquisition and installation of armaments and construction, installation of the "Harpoon" missiles will begin in the second half of this year in the "Descubierta" corvettes and the "Lazaga" patrol boats. So far they have been placed in five "Balears" frigates.

7717

CSO: 3548/312

MILITARY JUSTICE COUNCIL DENIES PARDONS TO '23-F' FIGURES

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 6 Aug 84 p 5

[Text] Madrid--The Supreme Council of Military Justice has reported unfavorably on all petitions for pardon that have been submitted by those sentenced for the 23-F coup d'etat, according to sources in the top military justice council.

The reasons for the unfavorable reports are basically technical, according to EUROPA PRESS. So far an average of 150 petitions for pardon has been received for each of the prisoners. The immense majority are signed by their relatives and friends.

Also the petitions have been mainly copied; the text is very similar. Sources in the Ministry of Defense feel that it is a well-organized campaign. One group of people writes the petitions which are later signed by friends and relatives.

Defeat

The fact that the Supreme Council of Military Justice has reported unfavorably on these petitions for pardon is interpreted in military circles as a total defeat for certain sectors trying to win the battle for pardon for the 23-F coup members. However, it is a defeat in the strictly legal sense.

The battle is not over on the political plane and this is a pardon with mainly political characteristics. In case the subject of pardon comes up in the Ministry of Defense, it would be better if the report of the Supreme Council of Military Justice were favorable.

However, a favorable report from the top military council is not an indispensable requirement for the government to decide to grant a pardon. However, military circles commented yesterday, upon learning the news, that the position of the Supreme Council of Military Justice will heavily influence the Ministry of Defense when it considers that possibility.

After discussing the possibility of a pardon on numerous occasions--which has been mildly denied by official sources at the Ministry of Defense in recent months--the only thing certain is parole for one of those sentenced, Capt Jose

Luis Abad, after he served two-thirds of his sentence. Part of his sentence was lifted because of his administrative activities in prison, according to sources at the Ministry of Defense.

Opposition

Granting this parole which establishes a precedent for others sentenced has not been well received in leftist opposition circles, the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and even some sectors of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. According to the magazine CAMBIO 16, in the middle of July 1983 there was a secret government bill to grant parole to the majority of the coup members. Although the Ministry of Defense denied the reports of the weekly then, the reality a year later was that Captain Abad was out on parole.

There is also the circumstance that former Lt Gen Jaime Milans del Bosch, sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, will be 70 years old on 8 June 1985. If civilian regulations are applied, the prisoner can be paroled.

The statements by Josep Tarradellas on one side and Pablo Castellanos on the other in favor of some type of pardon for the coup members caused some surprise in political circles. Minister Narcis Serra himself had to counter this, stating that he did not share the ideas of the former president of the Generalitat.

Another question that has come out on many occasions is the possibility of combining the pardon of the 23-F coup members with the readmission in the Armed Forces of the officers expelled from the UMD [Military Democratic Union]. The interested parties in the UMD have flatly rejected this.

The truth is that there was a campaign in which even generals participated; their petitions for pardon were published by EL ALCAZAR. The decision by the Supreme Council of Military Justice to report unfavorably on pardon for the prisoners is a harsh blow for the aspirations of those who want to see them out on the streets soon. However, the majority will be out on parole after serving two-thirds of their sentence following Captain Abad's precedent.

Capt Jose Munecas Aguilar and Capt Vicente Gomez Iglesias are next to leave prison. The same steps will be followed later for Com Ricardo Pardo Zancada, Lt Col Pedro Mas Oliver, Col Miguel Manchado Garcia, Col Diego Ibanez Ingles and Col Jose Ignacio San Martin Lopez.

This will occur if the individual pardons are approved by the government. Otherwise, those sentenced must serve at least two-thirds of their sentence.

7717

CSO: 3548/312

GREENLAND PRIME MINISTER WANTS TO CUT HOUSING AID

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Jul 84 p 10

[Article by Dan Axel: "Hoyem Wants to Cut Greenland Housing Aid"]

[Text] "The prime minister persists by again trying to funnel more funds into the Royal Greenlandic Trade (KGH)," said Poul Qvist Jorgensen.

The housing shortage in Nuuk--Godthab--is now so catastrophic and enormous that the mayor of the city has issued a pamphlet warning people not to move there until they can arrange for housing.

More than 1,300 persons are now waiting to find housing in Nuuk, which is the educational city on Greenland, featuring a teachers' college, a nurse's aid school and social educational facilities.

Not only students are waiting for a place to live in Nuuk, but a large number of homeless as well, such as victimized women without a roof over their heads after being thrown out of the house by their husbands. Excessive use of alcohol is greatly to blame for this.

The official pamphlet further states that "approximately 800 of those who seek housing are now living with family or acquaintances. Many homes are overcrowded, which destroys family life, creates unrest and unhappiness, and inhibits the desire to hold a job or pursue an education."

"Based on this, it must be disquieting that Greenland Prime Minister Tom Hoyem once more seems prepared to cut Danish housing aid to Greenland families," Poul Qvist Jorgensen (Social Democratic Party) told BERLINGSKE.

He has therefore asked Tom Hoyem to refute the rumor that he is planning to funnel more money into the Royal Greenlandic Trade by cutting funds appropriated for housing on Greenland. Poul Qvist Jorgensen was part of a parliamentary delegation that recently spent 14 days on Greenland, where it was rumored that Hoyem was working on a new design for Greenland's housing aid.

"Since it came into office, the nonsocialist government tried once before to do away with the extraordinary housing aid to Greenland," said Jorgensen.

"At that time, we managed to prevent a gouging of the housing quota. Based on this, it is disquieting that the Greenland prime minister perseveres. First of all, he can expect to lose popularity--if this is possible--among Greenland mayors and the population as a whole, for that matter. Secondly, he will have to face a series of questions in Parliament, to which he may have difficulty finding reasonable answers," said Jorgensen.

8952

CSO: 3613/218

AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY TO CUT 50,000 JOBS WITHIN 5 YEARS

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Aug 84 pp 1, 19

[Article by Veronique Maurus]

[Text] The initial recommendations of the commission chaired by Mr Dalle, PDG [president-director general] of L'Oreal, who was charged by the government with the preparation of a report on the automobile industry, have produced shivers. The figures generated by the commission's work demonstrate in fact that traditional measures (early retirement, separation aid) will not be sufficient to solve the social problems of the sector. The same is true of the usual financing mechanisms being tried to alleviate the financial burden weighing down the two French groups.

Although extremely theoretical, and according to one of the members of the commission, only representing "an approximation of the industrial reality of the two groups," the numeric projections of the Dalle commission are impressive.

In the next 5 years (including 1989), 50,000 to 60,000 wage earners out of a currently estimated total of 235,000 to 240,000 persons, will have to leave the ranks of the two French groups, in addition to normal attrition estimated at 1.5 to 2 percent of the work force per year, that is, 18,000 to 24,000 persons over a 5-year period, with account taken of the necessary hiring of young persons (about 2,400 per year, that is, a total of 12,000).

The commission has in fact estimated that it is necessary for the two groups to improve their productivity by 7 percent per year, which would be translated into a corresponding drop in the number of wage earners, supposing that production would be maintained at a level at least equal to that of 1983--which will not be the case in 1984.

In addition to these reductions in the automobile sector properly speaking, the Federation of Equipment Manufacturers has estimated that in this sector 20,000 to 25,000 jobs will also have to be eliminated in the next 5 years, which would bring the total of necessary manpower reductions in the industry to 70,000 or 85,000 at a minimum (without taking into account sectors such as tires and auto repair, also in trouble).

In view of the scope of the problem posed, it is clear that traditional methods, such as early retirement or separation aid for immigrants, will not be sufficient. From this came the idea, now under study, of creating a special procedure for the sector similar to the Italian Cassa Integrazione [Integration Fund]. Such a solution would be all the more necessary if the two manufacturers, increasingly pressed by the poor current situation and perhaps wishing to strike while the iron is hot, are said to have let it be known that it would be useful, indeed necessary, for these reductions to be made as soon as possible, particularly during the next 18 months.

In the financial sector, members of the commission have been frightened by the size of the indebtedness (about 30 billion francs for each manufacturer) and the financial charges being borne (3 to 4 billion francs per year for each group). From this came the idea, in this sector also, of finding special financing procedures, to permit the manufacturers to maintain a level of sustained investment in the coming years, which their present financial situation no longer permits them (PSA has already cut back its plans considerably; in turn, Renault is studying the postponement of some of its most costly projects). The figure of 20 billion francs advanced by M. Marchelli, president of the CGC [General Confederation of Managerial Personnel], who is proposing the granting of a public loan to save the French automobile sector, would correspond) "broad brush" to the scale of the proposals now under study by Dalle, in coordination with the public authorities.

We understand that in these circumstances the two French groups, at first somewhat reticent vis-a-vis the commission's work, are showing themselves to be increasingly interested by the possibilities offered. Thus the Renault Board, whose chairman, M. Harmon, said almost a year ago to the day, "There is no problem of surplus manpower in 1983," seems to have made up its mind, like its competitor, the PSA group, to apply the knife to its problem quickly.

Reports which leaked out of a meeting of the enterprise's central committee seem in fact to indicate that the manufacturer, pressed by the accelerated drop in its sales in the past 6 months (minus 23 percent in France) and the enormous upsurge in its losses--which for the group could reach about 6 billion francs in 1984 (compared to 1.5 billion last year), including 4 billion attributable to the automobile sector alone and 2 billion to industrial vehicles--has elected to proceed much more quickly than planned with a drastic reduction in its manpower.

In addition to the measures already taken in 1983: early retirement plan (3,500 wage earners) and separation aid for immigrant workers (which should involve 1,000 persons), the Board may soon announce a new series of job cuts, although it says that no formal decision has been made by management and that the authorities have not been officially notified of such plans. The figure of 15,000 necessary job cuts is said to have been brought up within the framework of the Board's 3-year plan.

FINANCE MINISTER: NO NEW TAXES IN 1985

Athens ETHNOS in Greek 26 Jul 84 p 12

[Article by Giouli Nikolaidou]

[Excerpt] The country's gross national product is increasing by 2 percent in 1984, a fact which will make it possible for the government not only to avoid imposing new taxes in 1985, but on the contrary to make tax cuts for certain income categories.

Inflation will continue at around 18 percent, and a new price policy is coming into view, with the abandonment of the policy of marketing decrees and the stimulating of competition in the marketplace.

At the same time the government is giving weight to the implementation of the major projects of the 5-year program, such as that of the diversion of the Akheloos River and the reclamation of the Amvrakikos Gulf, by the formation of the Council for Overseeing the 5-year Program and the sending of 200 scientists into the countryside.

The government's successful policy is continuing in dealing with the sector of companies in difficulty, and sometime this autumn Minister of National Economy Ger. Arsenis will make statements "of major importance" on this, revealing at the same time the things which are responsible for the present situation of these businesses.

For 1985, the government is preparing a "budget mirror" which will show where the taxes are going and for what purposes they are being used.

The above features emerge from yesterday's statements by Arsenis on the course of the Greek economy in the first 6 months of 1984 and its prospects up to the end of the year.

In his statements to financial reporters, which took 2 hours to deliver, the minister pointed out the following:

The Objectives

"The objectives which the government has set for 1984 will be implemented. And this means that the moderate recovery which we had planned for will be realized. This should be a source of satisfaction for all of us."

"The economic policy of 1983 and 1984," explained the minister, "was for the economy to gradually approach a state of equilibrium."

"The reason for the policy choice in favor of a steady and gradual approach to our objectives is because of the deep structural problems of the Greek economy."

Thus, inflation will decrease to about 18 percent and the gross national product will exceed 1.5 percent, with certain predictions viewing it as likely to be near 2 percent.

The deficit in the balance on current accounts will continue this year also at \$1.8-1.9 billion. Impellents in the direction of an increase in the gross national product are: The increase in public investments amounting to 4.5 percent, the increase in the volume of exports of 5.5 percent, and the increase in consumption in both the public and private sectors.

From the statistical data which have appeared it emerges that the pay of workers will increase by 23 percent, whereas inflation will continue at around 18 percent, and thus we will have an increase in wages of 5 percent above the increase in the cost of living.

Arsenis explains that this provides a basis for an increase in private consumption and the reactivation of the Greek economy.

He pointed out also that this process will be helped along by agricultural production and the tertiary sector (services), and that these things will be conducive to a smaller degree to the stimulation of industrial production, which will show a small upturn in 1984.

Furthermore, private bank deposits are increasing at a more rapid rate than what had been predicted. That is, they are increasing by 27 percent instead of the 23 percent which had been expected. Thus, there is an easy-flowing liquidity in the national economy and some leeway in the financing of the private sector.

Taxation

No new taxes are being introduced in 1985, and it is even possible that new tax cuts will occur for certain categories of taxpayers.

Mr Arsenis said characteristically:

"Our judgement is that there is no likelihood of an increase in the tax burdens. On the contrary, in certain cases an adjustment of the tax rates for the relief of certain categories could be recommended."

And he concluded: "There are possibilities for an increase in the tax revenues, by the better apprehension of the assessment."

In coming weeks, a bill is being introduced in the Chamber of Deputies aimed at exterminating tax evasion.

"In this we are proposing"--said Arsenis--"specific measures for increasing the tax revenues."

At the same time, the method of examining tax returns is being simplified and modified; such checks are to be done on a sampling basis, as in other countries.

Thus, a more thorough-going examination of certain returns will be made, while severe penalties will be imposed on violators.

Income Policy

Increases commensurate with the increase in the production and the productivity of our economy will be given to workers in 1985, while the 5-year program will protect the income of the workers from inflation.

This conclusion emerges from the responses of Arsenis to relevant questions. The minister said:

If the Greek economy shows an increase in its national product, the workers as well will benefit from this.

Question: Will the ATA [automatic cost of living readjustment] be made an institution by legislative action?

Answer: With its income policy, the 5-year program takes care of the loss of purchasing power by the workers.

Question: Roughly 1 million workers have not yet signed collective agreements for this year. What will become of these?

Answer: The increases have been made. The signatures have not entered the picture.

The pay of workers has increased by 23 percent in comparison with 1983, while at the same time inflation is being held to 18 percent and there is no change in productivity.

Question: Will the 37.5-hour work week be implemented?

Answer: This issue is under study and discussion. At this time I cannot tell you what the political line will be on the 37.5-hour issue.

Question: What do you have to say about the memorandum from the industrialists to the minister of labor which calls for the abolition of the ATA?

Answer: I have not read it.

Budget

The government is hoping to construct a "budget mirror" for 1985 on what the taxpayer pays and where his money goes.

The minister stressed that "we are optimistically commencing the preparation of the 1985 budget, and our main concern is to draw this up in a timely fashion."

It will be a developmental budget--within the course charted by the 5-year program--with a shifting of expenditures to investment projects.

At the same time it will aim to reduce the deficits of the public sector in relation to the gross national product.

One of its chief features will be its clarity.

A new accounting plan will show the flow of the revenues in the direction of the specific expenditures.

It will not show the expenditures and outlays of the State according to items and agencies, but rather according to sectors and programs.

"It is time that the taxpayer becomes informed," said the minister characteristically.

The 5-year Program

In 1985 special emphasis will be given to the realization of the major projects of the 5-year developmental program of the government (particularly with respect to the Akheloos and Amvrakikos projects). The Ministry of National Economy is proceeding to make administrative changes.

By a decision which will be announced soon, the nomarchies and the regional services are receiving support in the form of 200 scientific specialists for the sake of the speedier implementation of the 5-year program.

Administratively, these 200 scientists will be connected with the ministry and with the KEPE [Center for Planning and Economic Research].

At the same time, a Council for Overseeing the 5-year Program is being established for the purpose of coordinating the projects.

"The major development projects of the 5-year plan, such as the diversion of the Akheloos and the reclamation of the Amvrakikos Gulf"--stressed Arsenis--"along with the major industrial projects (alumina project, and so forth), will create new centers of economic development in the coming years."

Inflation

In the first 6 months of 1984, the consumer price index shows that we are running at a rate of 18.2 percent--that is, near the 18-percent target.

"Of course," stressed Arsenis, "it would be even better if we could reduce inflation below 18 percent," and "for this purpose an effort on the part of everybody is needed."

"We are beginning the battle against inflation, but the serious foreign and structural problems involved are making the combating of this inflation an arduous job." "

He pointed out that a restrictive monetarist policy would lead to an increase in unemployment.

In any case, "every year we gain a few centimeters in the battle" (1981--25 percent, 1982--22 percent, 1983--20 percent, 1984--18 percent).

In 1984 inflation could fall below 18 percent, but as the minister said, the following have had an adverse influence:

The international monetary instability and the appreciation of the dollar.

The non-implementation of the government's income policy in certain areas of the private sector and in certain large companies.

The bad weather conditions in May and in June, which delayed the fruit and vegetable harvest and resulted in the development of higher prices than last year.

The minister explained that "in certain areas, collective agreements have been fixed with terms in excess of the income policy, and this has resulted in a decrease in competition, an increase in prices, and the vanishing of wage gains."

He alluded to earlier statements he has made, to the effect that this year's income policy "takes full advantage of the possibilities of the economy" and that to go beyond it will lead to unemployment.

To a question as to which branches of industry have not followed the income policy, Arsenis said that "I do not have the figures within easy reach, but the phenomenon is widespread," and he emphasized:

"It is a fantasy that by satisfying the demands for increases the standard of living will be improved somewhat, because such increases will reverse themselves with an increase in prices and a decrease in employment."

Prices-Competition

The answers from Arsenis on the price policy and the measures taken by Kedikoglou reveal a new policy in the sector of prices and in the market.

"In many cases," said the minister, "the fixing of prices on the basis of cost and profit or on the basis of price ceilings does not lead to the countering of inflation.

"We do not want policing of prices, but rather a sharpening of competition and a gradual withdrawal from the fixing of prices by administrative decisions.

"Marketing decrees based on cost create inflationary pressures."

Question: Do you disagree with the measures taken by Kedikoglou?

Answer: The goal is to reform the market and to strengthen competition.

The duty of the government is to oversee the marketplace and in certain cases to undertake interventions for the sake of the proper functioning of competitive conditions.

We have taken specific measures on behalf of the marketing sector, we have an up-to-date price list, and in the course of time we will create a sound basis for a national price list which can be debated with the productive classes and the workers.

Questions have been raised by certain agencies with respect to certain marketing decrees.

Nobody is infallible.

The problems can be discussed in the consultative committee on prices.

There are also unresolved issues which will come up for discussion in the Income and Price Committee.

There is a certain gap between measures taken and intentions.

The Magnitudes of the Economy

The magnitudes	Final predictions	Initial predictions	1983
	1984	1984	
Gross national product	+2%	+1.5%	+0.3%
Inflation	+18.2%	+18%	+20.5%
Job pay	+23%	--	+19.1%
Exports	+5.5%	+4%	-0.8%
Private deposits	+27%	+23%	--
Deficit on current accounts	\$1.8 billion	\$1.9 billion	\$1.9 billion

12114

CS0: 3521/326

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN ALGERIA, USSR, POLAND

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 27 Jul 84 p 17

[Article by A. Alexandropoulos]

[Excerpts] Algeria, the Soviet Union, and Poland will be the sites for the first technical projects which will be carried out, beginning at the end of this year or early in 1985, by the State company EKETE AE [Greek State Company for Technical Projects], which was founded last year for projects in foreign countries.

As a representative of EKETE AE stated to TO VIMA:

1. Last June an agreement was signed in Athens, with representatives from Algeria who had been invited to Greece, having to do with the execution of construction of the first 2,000 homes in Djidjelli. This pertains to the first phase of the initial framework agreement for 11,000 homes. For this program the Regulatory Plans will be worked out, while for the architectural and construction studies there is already some preparatory work from the previous programs involving construction projects which had been elaborated by the EKETE AE for Algeria (in other cities).

In Leningrad

2. In the protocol on technical cooperation between Greece and the Soviet Union which Alternate Minister of National Economy K. Vaitzos signed recently in Moscow, explicit reference is made to a commissioning to the EKETE AE of three large construction projects involving tourism. These pertain to the building of a new hotel with 1,700 beds, as well as to the modernization of two large old hotels having 1,000-1,200 beds in Leningrad. The estimate for the program is roughly \$125 million, a sum which includes the study, the construction of the three projects, and the utilization of Greek building materials (sanitary fixtures, glass panes, wood products, and so forth). The EKETE AE has commissioned to five Greek designing offices the job of preparing the preliminary studies for the three tourist projects, and in August the best solution will be chosen, about which the Soviet side also will have a say via "Intourist." Next the definitive contracts will be signed, and if everything develops normally, the three projects will begin to be constructed in the initial months of 1985 by a consortium of Greek contractors, with EKETE AE having the responsibility at

all times. The Greek side intends to seek--and it is considered certain that it will be successful in this--the assigning to the EKETE AE of other projects as well when the "Leningrad program" is well under way or has been completed, at which time the ability of Greece in connection with the construction of tourist projects in the Soviet Union will have been demonstrated in practice.

In Warsaw

3. There are hopes that the EKETE AE will be assigned the construction in Warsaw of a 40-story tower having a height of 120 meters, which will be the "terminal" for the Polish airline company and foreign airlines. The Polish government has asked for bids from the West Germany (private parties), Yugoslavia, and the EKETE AE. Optimism is being voiced that this project, the estimate for which is \$60 million, will be commissioned to the Greek state company.

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CSO: 3521/326

BRIEFS

EEC GRANTS FOR 1983--The total figure for the grants to Greece in 1983 from the European Community Fund came to 114 million European Monetary Units (where 1 EMU = about 88 drachmas). One primary feature of the way the 1983 funds have been administered has been the amount of aid for programs to combat unemployment, especially that of young people. Altogether, the programs which were submitted to the fund called for financing totaling 3,179,540,000 EMU. The granting of 1,949,160,000 EMU was approved, and finally a percentage of 96.33 percent was provided. In 1983 the expenditures of the Community Fund were equal to 6.39 percent of the Community Budget. Greece is getting a very small share of the financing money of the fund, which has focused a significant amount of its resources on Great Britain. And this is the case not only because that country has extensive unemployment, but also so as to cover public-finance repayments. [Excerpts] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Aug 84 p 7] 12114

COMMERCIAL FLEET REDUCTION--The Greek merchant fleet has seen a reduction of 11.8 percent with respect to the number of ships and of 10.7 percent in terms of tonnage within the period of time from 1 June 1983 to 31 May 1984. At the end of May the strength of the fleet was 3,082 ships with a total tonnage of 34,713,125 register tons, compared to 3,494 ships (that is, now there are 412 fewer ships) with a total tonnage of 38,862,888 register tons at the corresponding date last year. In the period of time being considered, 237 ships were entered in the Greek ship register, and 649 ships were stricken off. Moreover, Greek-owned ships flying foreign flags whose crews are insured in the Seamen's Retirement Fund (NAT) came to 362 ships with a total tonnage of 6,675,486 register tons, whereas at the corresponding date last year there were 429 such ships with a total tonnage of 7,783,999 register tons. In toto, within the above period of time the Greek-owned merchant marine consisting of ships of 100 gross register tons and above numbered 3,444 ships, with a total tonnage of 41,388,611 register tons. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 27 Jul 84 p 17] 12114

EEC LOAN--Sewer projects in Ioannina, Kastoria, Larisa, and Ptolemais will receive loans from the European Investment Bank. Yesterday--Thursday--Deputy Minister of National Economy Andonis Georgiadis and the president of the bank, Le Portz, signed the agreement with which the Greek State will receive a loan of 950 million drachmas, which constitutes the third and final portion of a total loan of 2.8 billion drachmas which is being granted for completing the projects in the four cities. The loan is going

to be made over to the municipal enterprises which are constructing drainage works for rainwater and sewage in Ioannina, Larisa, Ptolemais, and Kastoria, and to biological purification facilities in Larisa and Kastoria. The agreed-on loan carries an interest of 10.8 percent and will be paid back in 15 years with a grace period of 3 years. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 27 Jul 84 p 17] 12114

CS0: 3521/326

BANK OF PORTUGAL REPORT ON STABILIZATION RESULTS

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 28 Jul 84 p 17

[Text] The stabilization policy has made it possible to reduce the foreign and public sectors deficit. However, it has slowed down economic activity, created unemployment and accelerated inflation, according to the annual report of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Portugal, which further says that "everything indicates that this situation will continue into the foreseeable future."

The cost trends recorded for the administrative public sector (SPA) in 1983 are basically a result of the behavior of current revenue and a sharp decrease in capital expenditures. The increase in current revenue (36 percent) can be mainly attributed to the advance payment of Bank of Portugal earnings and to special taxes applied in 1983, which led to a 2-percent increase in tax receipts.

The increase in current expenditures (28.9 percent) was essentially the result of an increase in interest (45.4 percent) and in subsidies (40.9 percent), despite an increase in administrative costs. Public consumption continued to rise at a high rate (4.2 percent in real terms).

To finance the SPA deficit, which was about 218 million contos, and to amortize the direct public debt, the government had to borrow a total of 308.6 million contos, 103 million of which were foreign credits. As a result, the direct public debt totalled 1,272.5 million contos by the end of 1983, or about 60 percent of GDP.

These figures are taken from the overall analysis of the national economy appearing in the report by the Board of Directors of the Bank of Portugal, which was published this week and confirms the data published by SEMANARIO over 2 months ago.

The Stabilization Policy

The stabilization policy dominated Portuguese economic developments in 1983. Its primary objective was to reduce the external imbalance, which was reflected in the excessive current trade deficit and the increase in the

foreign debt. The immediate problems of financing the external deficit and the anticipated increase in debt servicing--which were worrisome because of their impact on economic growth possibilities--made adoption of a relatively rapid adjustment policy urgent.

Two types of measures were implemented to reduce the current trade deficit. On the one hand, domestic demand was reduced, and on the other, the supply of exportable goods was stimulated. Included in the first group of measures was a sharp increase in direct and indirect taxes, the reduction of certain SPA expenditures, and a freeze on investment expenditures of the government enterprise sector (SEE). This increase in income and decrease in expenditures led to a reduction of the overall deficit of the public sector (SPA + SEE), which was another objective of the stabilization policy.

BTC Deficit: 1.6 million

The current trade (BTC) deficit was reduced to \$1,686 million by the end of the year, or about half of what it was in 1982. Thus the trend towards increasing deficits, which had been observed ever since the first agreement with the IMF, was reversed. The BTC deficit went from 13.4 percent of GDP in 1982 to 7.4 percent in 1983. This improvement can essentially be attributed to the favorable movement of goods, services and receipts, as there was a 1.7 percent deterioration in the terms of trade and remittances of migrant workers declined.

Monetary policy also played an important role in reducing demand in 1983 (which fell 7 percent). The money supply and total credit to the economy decelerated considerably. Difficulties in obtaining access to international financial markets and restrictions on financing to the SPA, imposed by the IMF, contributed to this slowdown. In the second group of measures relating to changes in domestic supply and demand, the principal instrument used was the exchange rate. In 1983, the devaluation of the escudo was more than enough to offset the difference between the increase in costs and prices in Portugal and abroad, according to the report.

Moreover, the rise in the relative price of exportable and importable goods and services penalized demand and should stimulate the production of this type of goods and services.

20.5 Percent Devaluation of the Escudo in 1983

Part of the stabilization program--a more restrictive monetary policy--has been in effect since the end of 1982. Beginning in June 1983, the rest of the measures under the plan, part of the agreement with the IMF, were announced and adopted. The counterparts of the results obtained in 1983--a reduction in the current foreign trade deficit (6.4 percent of GNP), an increase in domestic savings (9.5 percent of GNP), and a reduction in the public sector deficit--were a decline in economic activity, a considerable reduction in employment and income, and a sharp acceleration in inflation, according to the same report.

The economic decline was basically the unavoidable result of the measures to reduce domestic demand, which in turn caused a decline in employment. These combined factors, exacerbated further by the increase in direct taxes, led to a decrease in disposable income. Inflation was primarily the result of the major administrative increases in goods and services, together with the policy to devalue the escudo (by 20.5 percent) applied in 1983.

The need to reduce the current trade deficit drastically meant that the Portuguese economy could not join its principal partners in their economic recovery. Everything indicates that the situation will remain the same in the foreseeable future, added the Bank of Portugal, which is what the majority of the Portuguese people think, according to a survey published on page 13 and stating that things will worsen in the future.

9805

CSO: 3542/100

PESSIMISM EXPRESSED ON REDUCTION OF INFLATION

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 28 Jul 84 p 17

[Article by F. Sarsfield Cabral]

[Text] It is not impossible that the rate of increase in prices will decline so that the Government's forecast for a 23 percent rise between December of last year and this December will hold true. But, it does not appear to be an easy task.

In the first place, the sharp decline in economic activity since the last quarter of 1983 has only made a very slight contribution to slowing down inflation--which is a bad sign (it is true that the government-imposed restriction on demand has also manifested itself in cuts in price subsidies, or in other words, in this context, the recession is a factor of inflation, and this in turn was a decisive factor in restricting demand).

Nothing guarantees a significant decline in the dollar in the next few months, while the monthly devaluation of the escudo is 1 percent, making imports more expensive (and about one-third of the rise in prices in the past 7 years has been from imported inflation). Moreover, and here we have the old vicious circle, it will be difficult to reduce the sliding devaluation, when our rate of inflation (32 percent) is 6 times the average OECD rate (a little over 5 percent).

Furthermore, the global deficit of the public sector will not decline dramatically this year (14.5 percent of the gross domestic product in 1984, as compared to 15.2 percent in 1983), although the simple creation of money will finance part of this deficit, which is perhaps less than usual (and at the same time increase inflation).

"A lasting deceleration of inflation must be one of the central medium-term policy objectives," the OECD said in its recent report on Portugal, adding that "the competitive policy to be introduced in 1984 will be a very important way of improving market operations. It is essential to continue to liberalize prices and income and reduce the rigidity of the labor market." In other words, inflation cannot be curbed by restricting the market, but, on the contrary, by making it work properly.

In his speech in January at the National Defense Institute, the Minister of Finance stressed the need to reintroduce norms of rationality into the economy. He said that "the price mechanism plays its role in allocating scarce resources and providing the information needed by the economic agents." The Financial and Economic Recovery Program hardly refers to prices, however, and what has happened with the income bill does not show that the government is making any major effort to ensure that the market functions.

9805

CSO: 3542/100

PRODUCTION, MARKETING IMPACT OF MARITIME REFORM

San Sebastian EGIN in Spanish 3 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] Bilbao--"The surplus workers are still in the funds (Job Promotion Funds) waiting for the ship construction boom which is predicted now so that we can exploit that." Pedro Sancho, director of the naval division of the INI [National Institute of Industry], stated this to the news agency COLPISA.

He added: "If we are not competitive by then, the 'boom' will pass us by and the orders will go directly to Korea and Japan which offer technology and low costs. However if our competitiveness has improved, we will be able to grow starting from the minimum."

These statements which were part of more general ones came about after the agreement on the reconversion plan for small and medium shipyards. The proposal that the INI naval division has drawn up for large shipyards is still on the negotiating table where it will be for a month, until 28 August.

"Delay in Start-up"

Throughout these statements, Pedro Sancho complained about the delay in the start-up of the naval reconversion plan because of the negative consequences that could stem from it. One example is the possible difficulty in contracting the construction of a ship practically every week to fulfill the plans, given the short term for beginning the application of the reconversion plan (October).

He added: "Worse, there is the unfortunate situation we are in since the INI naval division needs 22 billion pesetas from now until the end of the year to fill the gap. About 15 billion must be allocated for the payroll since it totals 2.5 billion per month."

Later Pedro Sancho praised the Galicia Xunta's stand. It announced its decision to subsidize the construction of small and medium ships in that autonomous community. Sancho feels that the problems of the naval sector could be alleviated with economic aid from the different autonomous communities affected by naval reconversion.

"Concentrate Production"

Pedro Sancho has expressed the urgent need to concentrate production. In this sense, the director of the INI naval division revealed: "The problem of capacity must be worked on. Otherwise, the sector will be dead in a couple of years. All the participants, including the unions, recognize that. On the horizon for 1987 there will not be more than 250,000 TRBC [expansion unknown]. That is also the minimum. It would be senseless to divide those 250,000 TRBC among five shipyards; it would be like dividing up poverty. It is absolutely necessary to first concentrate production. Only a minimum work load makes a payroll like a shipyard needs for new construction viable."

In this context, Pedro Sancho praised the aid from the Galicia Xunta and referred to the need for other autonomous communities which will have naval reconversion to make "certain sacrifices."

"Competitiveness, Key to Reconversion"

After analyzing the situation of the Spanish fleet--limited in every class--and the insolvency of many of its shipbuilders, Pedro Sancho expressed his skepticism about internal demand being the activator for ship production. He ended that it is urgent and vital to become competitive which, in his opinion, is the key to naval reconversion.

Sancho stated: "Our chance lies mainly abroad, again becoming competitive as we have been in other times. That is the key to naval reconversion; anything else would only be a facelift."

The director of the INI naval division has admitted that on the horizon for 1987, 250,000 TRBC is a minimum. "This production would be divided among three shipyards. However, the others will not be dismantled or decapitalized. The workers will remain in the fund waiting for the ship construction 'boom' which is predicted now so we can exploit that opportunity."

Sancho concluded: "When the threshold of 250,000 TRBC is reached, we have two options: saturation of the three factories for new construction in the large shipyards or giving the work load to the other two shipyards. I would unquestionably bet on the first solution. However, I do not mean that the second is not negotiable based on other interests that are not strictly profitability. If the problems were so bad that agreement could not be reached, we would opt for a majority agreement, always based on that minimum threshold of viability--250,000 TRBC--for three large shipyards doing new construction."

7717

CSO: 3548/315

MADRID PROGRAM GEARED TO REDUCING MEAT, CEREAL IMPORT

Madrid ABC in Spanish 6 Aug 84 p 41

[Article by Cesar Lumbreras: "Spain Tries to Reduce Its Foreign Dependence on Imported Meats, Cereals"]

[Text] Madrid--Spain is trying to reduce its foreign dependence on meat and corn production, according to the recent agricultural decisions made by the government at the last Council of Ministers. Therefore, a corn development plan and a support program for extensive livestock farms based on native breeds were approved.

The objective of the corn development plan is to reduce the shortage in the supply of grain and livestock fodder by increasing the national area for corn and the production of corn. A number of aids for irrigation have been planned with subsidies that can reach 20 percent of the necessary investment as long as the farmer promises to allocate at least 30 percent of the transformed or improved area for corn for a period of 5 years.

Also subsidies will be granted for the construction and improvement of installations for storing and drying grain as well as acquiring the necessary machinery. Cooperatives, agrarian transformation associations and other agrarian associations can benefit from these aids to strengthen group agriculture with a subsidy of up to 25 percent for storage construction, installations and machinery and 30 percent for drying.

To complete this support, the recipients of subsidies have access to credits from the Agricultural Credit Bank established for these objectives. These loans can reach 70 percent of the difference between the budgeted amount and the subsidy.

The considerable savings in foreign currency that an increase in corn production and area will mean--although it will always be very limited due to climatological and soil conditions--will be complemented with the start-up of the national program for the development of extensive livestock farms. This basically means sheep, goats, cattle and Iberian swine, encouraging the development of native breeds that can better exploit the natural resources.

The subsidies for improvements on livestock farms reach 30 percent of the necessary investment for communal farms and groups of livestock raisers, 20 percent for individual family farms and young farmers and 15 percent for other individual farms.

The Agricultural Credit Bank can grant loans of up to 75 percent of the investment in the case of individuals, 80 percent for groups and 75 percent for families.

The intersectorial agreement between mussel producers and processors, the first in the history of this sector, is also important. It opens the door for other products like tuna, clams and cockles. There are draft projects already that might be finished this year.

This agreement in the mussel sector covers about 50,000 tons of mussels worth more than 1 billion pesetas that go to the Galician processing industry.

7717

CSO: 3548/315

SEVERANCE BILL DRAFTED; EDITORIAL OPPOSITION

Main Provisions of Bill

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 2 Aug 84 pp 1,9

[Text] The Ministry of Labor and Social Security has defined the basic outline of the funding bill known as the Severance Bill. According to information obtained from Ministry officials, the position of the Ministry pertaining to views expressed by management, labor and the university sector in connection with the severance bill has become more clarified. According to information received from high level Ministry officials the draft proposal which had previously been revealed to public opinion and presented for debate will become formalized following a number of modifications. The bill will subsequently be presented to the Council of Ministers for approval.

The official who stated that the bill will become law following minor modifications also indicated that the real purpose of the meetings held by the Working Assembly in connection with this bill involved the solicitation of management, labor and university opinion concerning the desirability of such a bill. The official said that since the parties remained in agreement, he expected the proposal to become law with only minor modifications.

Additional matters will also be addressed by the bill in question and preparations for the passage of the bill are to begin during the second week of August. New provisions to be appended to the bill include the payment of severance pay in one lump sum to workers who are retiring; the payment of severance pay on the basis of duration of prior service to workers who resign or who are being terminated, as well as the use of current salary as a means of determining the amount of premiums to be paid into the severance fund.

Other important provisions of the bill may be listed as follows: Government employees as well as workers will be covered by the fund which will be established within the structure of the Social Security Administration. Workers will become members of the fund upon employment and employers will have one month to inform the fund of the hiring of a new employee. Daily wages are to be used as a determinant of premiums and will range from an amount that is equal to the lowest insurance premium paid by a laborer to an amount that is no more than one thirtieth of one year's retirement compensation paid to the most senior government employee. Premiums are to be calculated in monthly increments and paid by employers in two payments to be made during the months of January and June. Workers and government employees with less than 15 years of seniority will also be covered by the fund.

Meanwhile, it has been announced that no decision has been reached concerning the interest to be applied to sums contained within the fund or the utilization of these sums. In a related development, repercussions are continuing within the Turkish Federation of Labor Unions in the aftermath of a joint declaration signed by government, labor and management representatives following meetings of the Working Assembly on 16, 26 and 27 July. The joint declaration which had been made public following its adoption contained a clause which stipulated the raising of the legal retirement age. This clause was not noticed by Sevkettin Yilmaz who as Chairman of the Turkish Federation of Labor Unions signed the declaration on behalf of labor. The ensuing unrest and discussions within labor ranks brought a strong statement from Sevkettin Yilmaz. The exact motive behind this statement which was delivered yesterday remains unclear. Discussion involving the raising of the retirement age as well as the objectives of the Five Year Plan for Economic Development as they pertain to the raising of the retirement age has replaced the matter of the severance bill as the issue of the day among union circles.

Ketenci Condemns Severance Fund

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 2 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] A representative from the Turkish Federation of Labor Unions said: "I cannot understand. On the first day, our people said that all was going well. Even those who had sought to abolish the severance fund for many years had taken a step backwards. How was the joint declaration adopted? How was the

Turkish Federation of Labor Unions placed in the position of supporting the raising of the retirement age? Frankly speaking, I am unable to explain this."

The Working Assembly which had been in session for the purpose of discussing the severance bill finally adjourned with a joint declaration announcing that the parties had reached agreement. The contents of the declaration are currently being discussed within public opinion yet we do not believe that anyone is able to understand what is being discussed. Everyone seems to agree that severance pay should be consolidated into a fund. Nevertheless, the means by which "currently existing worker's rights will be preserved without bringing new hardship upon employers" remain unclear. If a worker's severance pay is to be paid by the employer without any curtailment, why should an employer set aside funds which he could be investing so that workers can receive severance pay in the distant future? It is possible that a worker might leave his job or become delinquent in a manner that would remove the employer's obligation to provide severance pay. It is also highly unlikely that the employer would forfeit any opportunity to avoid paying severance pay. As a matter of fact, we do not believe that an easy formula can be found for the purpose of pooling severance pay into a single fund without curtailing existing employee rights or placing an additional burden upon the employer. It is for this reason that draft proposals dating back to the period during which Bahir Ersoy served as Minister of Labor have not produced legislation which would provide for severance pay consolidated into a fund. All previous draft proposals have tended to represent setbacks for workers and have met with strong reaction from both workers and management.

The fact that the flowery language of the joint declaration produced by the Working Assembly is devoid of any meaning will become evident when the final version of the proposal is released by the Ministry of Labor towards the month of September. So many conflicting viewpoints between labor and management were voiced during the deliberations of the Working Assembly that any decision by the Ministry of Labor will inevitably have to favor one of the two sides at the detriment of the other. One need not be very prescient to say that labor will sustain a much greater disadvantage. In particular, the original proposal submitted to the working assembly by the Ministry of Labor as a preparatory document to the current draft proposal is of a nature that would be very disadvantageous to the interests of the working class. The removal of severance pay as a financial burden upon an employer whenever a worker is removed from his job will undoubtedly become a disadvantage to workers if preventive measures are not taken.

The rights of the Turkish worker fall behind the legislation promulgated by democratic nations for the purpose of protecting workers' rights. It is only in the areas of severance pay and retirement age that labor legislation in Turkey exhibits any development. It is unfortunate that when labor - management issues are addressed in Turkey, the matters of severance pay and retirement age never fail to receive attention which seeks to impose further restrictions while other issues involving labor rights remain ignored. The Turkish worker does not have unemployment insurance or job security, and severance pay represents an attempt to remedy this situation. This reality is being ignored by law 2320 and law 2457 which impose a ceiling on severance pay and specify that severance pay may not exceed the retirement bonus that is paid to a civil servant. The legislation concerning this matter prohibits the discussion of severance pay during collective bargaining, the payment of severance pay in the event of voluntary separation or the growth of severance pay beyond a certain ceiling. A similar development involving an increase of premium days required before retirement had constituted an additional setback for workers. This legislation ignored the fact that early retirement in our country is brought about by unemployment. The legislation failed to take into account layoffs that may involve 30 to 50 percent of a workforce and the difficulty experienced by a worker in securing employment after his thirties.

Securing an increase of the retirement age from a Working Assembly that had originally met to discuss severance pay may indeed represent a great achievement for the Labor Ministry of the Ozal government. Public opinion has been led to believe that perfect agreement has been achieved between labor, management and government. The establishment of a fund to consolidate severance pay and the increase brought to retirement age will constitute a setback to the democratic rights of the Turkish worker.

While it is natural that management will welcome such developments, the acquiescence of the Turkish Federation of Labor Unions is difficult to understand. Officials from this organization voiced the following complaint: "We could not object to the consolidation of severance pay into a fund while billions of liras in severance pay for public sector employees remained blocked and unpaid within a similar fund. Nevertheless we strongly criticized the proposal that the government presented to the working assembly. We indicated that we objected to the creation of a fund that would precede the securing of rights such as unemployment insurance and job security. It is under these circumstances that we signed the joint declaration."

The same officials indicate that the matter of retirement age amounts to a fait accompli by the Minister of Labor. The officials steadfastly maintain that the sentence pertaining to the retirement age was subsequently added to the text of the joint declaration. Let us hope that the working class has not been taken for yet another ride. Let us hope that they have not been made to surrender their last remaining rights in exchange for nothing.

9491

CSO: 3554/291

AGREEMENT NEAR IN MESS, TURK-IS DISPUTE

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Aug 84 pp 1,8

[Text] Istanbul News Service - After "irreconcilable differences" were officially recorded between the Turk Metal trade union which is affiliated to Turk-Is and the Metal Industrialists Trade Union (MESS), before the legal period of 6 days for naming a mediator had elapsed, yesterday grounds for an understanding were found. It is expected that a collective bargaining agreement will be signed in the days ahead for the group which is constituted by 50,000 workers employed in 140 workplaces.

The MESS chairman, Bahri Ersoz, disclosed after yesterday's meeting that apart from a few small differences related to salaries, an agreement had been reached and he said: "Above all, this agreement was made possible by the great sacrifices of the employer's side."

The President of the Turk Metal Trade Union, Mustafa Ozbek also spoke to the effect that: "Tomorrow morning (today) we will meet again with the MESS. There is very little ground to cover before we can shake hands."

Following the official recording of "irreconcilable differences" the other day, both sides met again. In that meeting, which began at 14.00 hours and ended toward the morning, at 05.00 hours, 20 articles on which agreement could not be reached were gone over again. While reaching an agreement on social welfare and on the subjects of shipping and management, due to the employer's stubborn stance the issue of wages remained unsolved. Upon which Turk Metal submitted another proposal.

The Turk Metal proposal takes the hourly wage of workplaces as a basis and separates it into 2 categories. With that proposal the workplaces' average wage of 185.00 Turkish liras is taken as a basis and divided into 2, (A) and (B), groups. It was pointed out that the number of workers in the workplaces which belong to category (A) is 40,000 and that there are about 10,000 workers in those that belong to category (B).

It has been learned that, according to the proposal, the wage hikes obtained for the workplaces that belong to category (B) are 7 to 8% lower relative to the other group.

MESS Chairman Bahri Ersoz, in the statement he made after grounds for an understanding had been found, said the following:

"Even though we were unable to reach an agreement on some small differences, I believe that tomorrow (today) we will have the pleasure to give the glad news. Above all, this agreement was made possible by the great sacrifices of the employer's side. The fact that a very large group was able to conclude collective bargaining negotiations in a positive manner without even resorting to arbitration will be a very gratifying development."

While it appeared that after the talks the MESS administrators had said their "last word on the subject," it was observed that Turk Metal President, Mustafa Ozbek, was attempting to convince the heads of his union's branch offices on the issue of the articles of the agreement.

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TURK-IS SIDE ON WORKER RIGHTS, COMPENSATION

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 16 Aug 84 p 3

[Interview with Sadik Side, Secretary General of Turk-Is; date and place not specified]

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN) - Turk-Is Secretary General, Sadik Side, answered the questions of TERCUMAN before the government-Turk-Is summit.

The questions put to the Turk-Is Secretary General and his answers were as follows:

Cold Shower

Question: What are your comments on the State Coordinating Committee's directives concerning workers' salaries? Can this be viewed as government intervention?

Answer: The State Coordinating Committee's directives concerning an upper and lower limit for worker salaries had the effect of a cold shower. We do not find such a development fair. The system of collective bargaining is a system that brooks no interference. After such an intervention, it is not possible to speak of collective bargaining. The text which is signed by the representatives of both sides, following negotiations which they carried out of their own free will is called collective bargaining. One can get nowhere with outside interventions and pressures. If there are those who believe that collective bargaining can be achieved under such conditions they will soon realize that they were gravely mistaken.

Question: On the subject of the Seniority Compensation Fund, there are opposing views among the public. What is your opinion on this subject?

Answer: The workers made a wrong evaluation on this issue. I explained this in my tour of 13 provinces of the east. There is no reason for discontent, this will be the only way out once its deficiencies are eliminated.

The Conflict Is Justified

Question: Turk-Metal and Metal-Is negotiations are at a deadend, there are rumors about a strike, news of preparations for a strike. What point did developments reach in this branch of labor?

Answer: It is true that a conflict has arisen. However, in accordance with the legislation, after appointing a special committee, an official mediator will be

elected. And on August 20 the official mediator will begin his task. As Turk-Is we will protect to the end, as before, the rights of the workers in these branches of labor and in all subsequent collective bargaining.

Bitter Medicine

Question: Will you make an official plea to the State Coordinating Committee to renounce its interventionist position before the summit?

Answer: Yes. I will confer with the honorable Alptemucin and I will express our wishes on this issue. Beside this, we will also get in touch with some ministers. We will talk with the Minister of Energy on the obstruction of collective bargaining in the labor branch of mining and with the Minister of Justice about our proposal for a law that will carry penalties in connection with the payment of insurance premiums which are due.

Question: Would you care to elaborate a little on this law proposal, what stage has it reached?

Answer: Our law proposal is a "bitter medicine" proposal and caused quite an uproar. Because it foresees imprisonment as the ultimate penalty. Our law proposal, which foresees a heavy money penalty for those who refuse to pay the insurance premium after a certain period projects a fine that will vary between a minimum of 140,000 Turkish liras and 400,000 Turkish liras and, in case of recidivism, an imprisonment penalty and it is already in the hands of the Assembly.

Question: Worker salary hikes are held responsible for the economic crisis and for inflation being pulled down. Do you share this view?

Answer: That is the way of the world. It is the unchanging stance of employers, of those who try to control the economy. This is encountered very often both in our own country and in other countries. It is as if by saying so they are attempting to put a brake on trade union demands. It is a stance which is tantamount to saying: "See... Our situation is not too good, be careful in your demands, do not ask for too much."

If inflation increased during the past 4 years when wage hikes were restricted and collective bargaining had come to a standstill, this clearly proved that those [phenomena] do not stem from increases in worker salaries.

Reach The Age Limit Then Retire

Question: The proposal to raise retirement age to 55 caused some doubts in the sector of labor and led to an increase in petitions to retire; what are your views on this question?

Answer: Such a wish runs counter to facts in our nation. As our esteemed Premier also said, there are 3.7 million unemployed in Turkey. In a nation with so many unemployed it would be right, rather than raising retirement age, to lower it if possible. When so many young people are in the throes of unemployment, wandering around in search of a job, if someone who works wishes to retire it is wrong to tell him: "Reach the age limit and then retire." This was included as a tenet and a precaution in previous plans but it proved to be inapplicable. It will be the same this time around also.

REJECTION OF PLAN FOR REVENUE SHARING IN SEE'S

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 16 Aug 84 pp 1,9

[Article by Mehmet Kahraman "Regulations On Opening Up See's to People Inapplicable."]

[Text]The draft regulations on giving access to the public to State Economic Enterprises which function as corporations and to infrastructures such as bridges, dams and power plants by issuing profit-sharing title deeds have been turned down by the Economic Affairs Coordinating High Commission on the grounds that "they are inapplicable."

As a result of this development, the issuing of profit-sharing title deeds for the Bosphorus Bridge which it was announced were to be put on sale in August, has been postponed to a later date.

According to information obtained, the subcommittee appointed by the Collective Housing and Public Corporations Commission submitted last week the completed draft regulations on which it had been working for 1 1/2 month to the Economic High Commission. However, as a result of the study of the regulations carried out by the Economic High Commission which was constituted by the Premier's Assistant, Kaya Erdem, the Minister of Finance and Customs, Vural Arikan, Treasury and Foreign Trade Advisor, Ekrem Pakdemirli, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, Cahit Aral, and representatives of the State Planning Organization and the Central Bank, it was decided that they were "inapplicable" and they were returned to the relevant subcommittee to be reworked.

Subcommittee Struggling

It was pointed out that during the time the subcommittee was working on regulating the ways in which some state enterprises could be opened up to the public they met with various impediments. According to the information obtained, the subcommittee that consists of representatives of the Treasury and Foreign Trade Under-Secretariat, the Central Bank, the State Planning Organization, the Capital Market Organization, the Collective Housing and Public Corporations Commission, had encountered various difficulties in the course of its work. The main factors that interfere with the preparatory work for regulating the opening up of selected corporations to the public are their diverse financial structures and, more important, the fact that up to now there has been no previous example of such a type of regulation in Turkey.

Since there are no previous models for such regulations, this was one of the reasons for the difficulties encountered by the subcommittee, as one of the officials who is a member pointed out, who also said that in the course of their work they had also studied the English model, adding:

"The only example of public corporations being opened to the public or being turned over to the private sector can be found in England. And so we wrote to Turkey's Financial Councillorship in England and asked them for a report on this subject. But even this report was not sufficient for us because the KIT's [State Economic Enterprises] of England differ in various ways from the KIT's of Turkey. The subcommittee prepared draft regulations with an eye on existing objective conditions."

It was also pointed out that delays may occur in the preparatory work on the regulations due to the Higher Commission's instructions to rework them after it rejected them. The same subcommittee member who disclosed his views on the subject also noted that for the subcommittee to be able to do preparatory work on the regulations in the desired manner, it should go again through a period of investigation and he added:

"We already experienced previously the difficulty of making headway on this issue. Now we are faced again with the same problem. If we prepare a draft in a hurry it will fail to achieve the desired aim. For that reason a new period of investigation is necessary. And this means that our work will be set back by at least another month."

It was pointed out at the same time that the draft regulations which were submitted had been elaborated chiefly within a framework designed to make the sale of profit-sharing title deeds for the Bosphorus Bridge possible, which was the reason why the Economic Commission had found them wanting from the standpoint of "generality" and had rejected them.

The Economic Commission stresses the necessity to elaborate constitutional legislation, through the passing of regulations which will also make possible the opening up of other public enterprises and infrastructures to the public through profit-sharing title deeds.

Despite the fact that the sale of profit-sharing title deeds for the Bosphorus Bridge had been announced for August, officials are saying that in view of the new developments this will only be possible in the second half of September.

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KETENCI BITTER OVER HOBBOLED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 16 Aug 84 p 9

[Article by Sukran Ketenci in the Column "From The Labor World": "Collective Bargaining Is Not Working..."]

[Text] Workers have been smothered under the YHK [Supreme Arbitrary Council] rulings and although all hopes were tied to the collective bargaining system there is no hopeful news of collective bargaining talks.

The collective bargaining rights of about 700,000 workers for 1984 were taken out of their hands through a sly maneuver (by maintaining long term agreements) and they were delivered into the hands of the YHK. And by a second maneuver, on the assumption that inflation would be on that level, a 25% raise equivalent to a salary increase of 2000 for 1984 was projected by a basic resolution. Thus the salary raises determined for 700,000 workers, when converted into the net sums which came into their hands, were already lagging behind the price increases of the first 6 months of 1984.

The majority of this group of workers who have legal collective bargaining rights but are unable to use them will have deficits in their budget, will become impoverished during the second semester of the year in view of the consistently rising prices.

After a 4-year period, developments related to those workers who had managed to salvage their collective bargaining rights from the YHK were quite taken for granted... This group of workers, despite the fact that they are part of the trade union organization, is unable to use the right to collective bargaining because of the limitations brought about by the new trade union laws No 2821 and 2822. Due to the 10% requirement introduced in the branches of labor which makes trade unions eligible for collective bargaining, since a single trade union is unable to combine the 2 conditions of exceeding the 10% requirement and securing a 51% majority in workplaces, hundreds of thousands of organized workers are unable to use their collective bargaining rights and no provisions were made regarding this matter. The government persistently turns a blind eye to this problem. We do not know whether a solution has been thought out for those hundreds of thousands of workers who have been left out in the cold, however no efforts in this direction have been disclosed.

What a pity that Turk-Is, which will find itself in the position of answering for its responsibility, or rather its irresponsibility, regarding the survival

of competing trade unions, does not touch on this subject. It does not even dwell on the question of some of its affiliated trade unions which now find themselves in the position of being unable to use their right to collective bargaining because of the above mentioned limitations. We progressed rather far on the road of the second half of the year during which the right to use collective bargaining begins on paper. The Ministry has published the January and July statistics. The fact that an important trade union group will be unable to use the right to collective bargaining in the name of hundreds of thousands of workers is becoming established.

As if no one cared, it does not even appear anywhere on the agenda as an issue. What will become of those workers who, despite the fact that they belong to the trade union organization, are unable to use their right to collective bargaining? Will they continue to work for their old salaries and under the old agreement conditions? It is obvious that the Ministry wishes them to become members of those trade unions which were selected as meeting the [10%] requirement by displaying before the public eye statistics which were neither impartial nor correct.

However shifting at this point to trade unions which meet the requirement but on which the government does not rely is not a solution either. Because such a shift, securing a majority in workplaces, will take months and added to the months that have already elapsed the worker's loss in terms of periods without agreements will turn into years.

What will happen to this gap? Before you know it, January statistics, changes in the lists of trade unions which meet the requirements will create new related gaps and workers will be left without agreements...

As for the right to collective bargaining which is beginning to be applied to only a few hundred thousand workers and to which great hopes are tied: collective bargaining negotiations which could not begin because the Ministry did not issue within the legal time limits the necessary documents (trampling the law) have been set aside; and now let us take a look at the following large groups which have been written up in the press:

The State Coordinating Committee For Collective Bargaining passed a resolution for a 30% hike in salaries, in other words to the effect that the YHK basic ruling will not be exceeded. The Genel Maden-Is negotiations with the Zonguldak Works, for 51,000 workers, have reached an impasse. Trade unions ascribe this to the fact that the employer relies on the YHK. In any case, strikes are prohibited in that branch of labor and if an agreement cannot be reached, ultimately they will resort to the YHK. That is even if the trade union says "This is not possible", it will be made "possible" by a ruling of the YHK. The Turk-Is Secretary General, Side, in his declaration to the press the other day, rightfully complained about the resolution of the Coordinating Committee: "What is there to negotiate about a 30% which is limited all around?"

Employers of the private sector strove to enroll all the public sector employers in their confederation, the TISK [Turkish Confederation of Employers Unions]. They were afraid they might exceed their own basic rulings, give higher raises. Now they can breathe easily. TISK tenets, with this kind of ease, can also be applied to collective bargaining for the textile branch of labor which numbers

over 50,000. In the negotiations which have barely started, the representatives of Employers' Unions have already stated that they will follow TISK guidelines. Can the MESS [Metal Production Industrialists Union] employers do less? Negotiations with Turk Metal-Is for another group of 50,000 workers are at a deadend. Who knows what will happen next?

With such trade union cadres, with such material and, even more important, with such laws to whom can the right to strike and the power of collective bargaining be of any use?

The web has been woven in such a way that a portion of those who saved their skins from the YHK are totally left out in the cold. For another majority group, because of the prohibitions and postponements on striking, negotiations are ultimately dependent on the YHK, which leads to the same outcome. And as for those who can evade such a fate, the basic tenets of the Public Corporation Employers Coordinating Committee and those of the TISK, of which we too are aware now, have been set as a trap. And this is what is called a trade union system, the right to use collective bargaining.

And so where is the negotiating table around which the balanced forces of employer and employed confront each other, where is the autonomous right to collective bargaining?..

12278

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BUYERS, REAL ESTATE AGENTS ON EXORBITANT HOUSING COSTS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 23 Aug 84 p 6

[Text] Istanbul News Service - It was pointed out that the price of newly completed apartments in large cities has risen as against applications for individual loans which were much lower than expected. Despite the Minister of State Sudi Turel's words that: "Anyone who has 500,000 Turkish liras can buy a house," citizens who have 500,000 Turkish liras or who can raise 500,000 Turkish liras give up in view of increasing housing costs. Citizens say that their reluctance is caused mainly by the interest rates on bank loans which are too high. Another problem of the "homeless" citizen is that after he applies for a bank loan, procedures are very difficult. Citizens who bargain with a contractor and reach an agreement then make a fixed downpayment are forced to submit personally to the bank all kinds of official documents pertaining to the unit they will buy, ranging from the residence permit to the title deed. Since the "impasse" in which the citizens find themselves is quite obvious, real estate agents cannot help "sniggering" about what is being said and about current business transactions.

Here is what various citizens and real estate agents in different locations are saying:

Nevin Eren (45, housewife) - I do not know the law very well but according to my husband's explanations it is impossible to find a home below 2.5 million Turkish liras. And bank interest rates are apparently also very high. We have 2 children, there is no way we can pay a monthly interest of 40,000 Turkish liras. As it is, we are already paying a monthly rent of 25,000 Turkish liras. For the present a home is just a dream.

Mustafa Kacal (60, artisan) - Formerly rents were low, we did not buy a house so as not to decrease our capital. Now I want to buy a house but the cost of a habitable house begins at 6 million Turkish liras. I bargained and found a basement apartment for 5.5 million Turkish liras... But I am unable to make the interest payments on the bank loan we should get. This is no solution.

Huseyin Aral (40, salesman) - My wife too is a sales person. Between the 2 of us we earn almost 100,000 Turkish liras a month. I suppose we are average. Now for a 5 million Turkish lira home we can obtain 1,700,000 Turkish liras from the state which can be complemented by a bank loan. It seems that no one is aware of interest. It is impossible for us to make payments on an ever increasing bank interest rate. We have 2 children at school. No one who has 500,000 Turkish liras,

as was written in the paper, can buy a home.

Riza Erdem (retired civil servant) - I received a 1,200,000 Turkish lira retirement bonus. The state grants 1,700,000 Turkish liras. We are considering gritting our teeth and buying a home but the cheapest one costs 5 million Turkish liras. If we obtained from the bank a 2 million Turkish lira loan, we would be unable to pay all our debts of 50,000 Turkish liras a month, including interest. As it is, we already have a hard time paying a monthly rent of 20,000 Turkish liras.

Erhan Bilir (45, worker) - Together with my wife, we have a monthly revenue of 65,000 Turkish liras. We sold our plot of land in the village, we have 500,000 Turkish liras but we are calculating that the cheapest home costs 4 million Turkish liras. What the state gives is insufficient. And we would be unable to pay off a bank loan. We were expecting some better form of assistance.

Ismet Kalemli - I have saved a certain amount of money. But housing costs are too high. And what the state gives is too little. I am thinking of borrowing from a bank but monthly interest rates are too high. And it is expected of us to solve all those problems. It is difficult to find suitable housing. Contractors have raised prices, a habitable home costs at least 5 million Turkish liras. We do want to buy a house but wonder at the same time how we will manage to survive without food or drink.

What Do Real Estate Agents Say?

Haci Sukru (Pasabahce) - There is no house to be bought on credit in Pasabahce. Apart from the traditional shorefront villas everything else is jerry built. And even sales on shanties fell notably after the assigning of title deeds. A 2 bedroom, 1 living-room, 70 to 80 square meter unit sells for 7 to 8 million Turkish liras. While a 2-room shack sells for at least 4 million Turkish liras. There is no home that can be bought by a citizen of limited means, by a so called average worker. And his being able to make the purchase on credit is a delusion... The retiree who wishes to buy a 100 square meter home by paying 7.5 million Turkish liras, including interest, will not even live until the repayment period on this amount has expired. Under the circumstances, he can only leave debts to his grandson or his son as a legacy. With this kind of credit it is not for the average citizen but for the one well above average to buy a home.

Nurettin Selim Akin (Bebek) - It cannot be said that any building to speak of took place in Bebek in the past 6 or 7 years. And from 2 years ago to the present the ban on building is being implemented. In Bebek instead of the build and sell system, purchases from person to person are the practice. In view of the financial position of those who live in this area, an 80 to 85 square meter unit in Bebek sells for at least 10 million Turkish liras and can go up as high as 20 million Turkish liras. It would be hard to meet even the minimal building costs of a unit through an individual loan. No home can be bought with that kind of money.

Mustafa Akmaz (Bakirkoy/Kocasinan) - In Kocasinan there is no house to be bought which corresponds to existing credit conditions and it would be very difficult to find one; here an 80 to 85 square meter unit costs about 5 to 6 million Turkish liras. The loan granted for a 60 square meter unit more or less meets its cost

only. For a citizen to be able to buy a home, he must already have 1.5 to 2 million Turkish liras in ready cash... Then there are the loans granted to those who build a house on a plot of land they own. The price per square meter of such a plot of land which has to be within municipal limits and on which a house can be built starts from 5 to 7,000 Turkish liras in Kocasinan and, according to the location, can go as high as 15,000 Turkish liras. Furthermore, to obtain a loan, ground level must be reached in other words the building of the basement must be completed. According to the new development plan, a 25% share of the area is allowed for a 60 to 70 square meter house, because of which a plot of land close to 200 square meters is needed. And for such a plot of land one must already have 1 million Turkish liras. When you think that an equal sum is needed for the completion of the basement this means that the citizen must have close to 2 million Turkish liras in ready cash in his pocket, only after which he can obtain a loan. We get a lot of questions on this subject but we are unable to give an answer to those who ask them. I do not believe that a citizen can acquire a house by this method.

Ibrahim Erkul (Sirinevler) - At this point we have no house that corresponds to present conditions. In Sirinevler the cost of a 70 to 80 square meter unit begins at 3.5 to 4 million Turkish liras. We had a lot of applicants who wished to buy a home on credit but we have no unit on hand which conforms with their requirements and it is very difficult to find one. This kind of credit alone is not sufficient for the citizen to buy a home; he must also have 1 to 2 million Turkish liras in ready cash. At any rate the cost of a 70 to 80 square meter home is around 2.5 million Turkish liras.

Nurettin Dastan (Levent) - From 3 or 4 years ago to the present no building was done in these parts. Most of this location has been set aside as a green area. As for the buildings that have been started recently, permits for only 3 to 3.5 floors were issued and these are generally luxury homes. According to its location, the cost of 70 to 80 square meter house in Levent fluctuates between 7 or 8 and 15 million Turkish liras. The citizen who wishes to buy a house on credit cannot buy one here in any case and if he wishes to buy a house in some corner of the shore this sort of credit is definitely insufficient. He must have 2 million Turkish liras in his pocket. But the citizens who will buy a house on credit are, in any case, civil servants or workers with no money... May God help them...

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KETENCI PLEADS FOR EMPLOYERS' FULFILLING OBLIGATION TO WORKERS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 23 Aug 84 p 9

[Article by Sukran Ketenci in The Column "From The Workers' World": "Payments Due to Workers."]

[Text] We do not know how to reconcile this with the Ozal government's economic development. But news related to workplaces headed for bankruptcy have increased lately. And there are even more cases, prior to bankruptcy, of worker salaries and social security payments not being made. Some of the workers are left out in the cold, to starve under the label "salaried", without any salary or with a leave without pay that can last for years.

Because we have already given numerous examples of the workplaces and of the workers' plight in this column and in the paper's news items, we want to touch on the consequences of those occurrences which have turned into a multi-faceted problem without going into details. At present the accumulated salaries, social security payments and seniority compensations due to tens of thousands of workers, in hundreds of workplaces, are estimated to be in the billions.

At first glance the situation of the workers who are made to wait, are put off, condemned to starve without a salary for months, for years while important sums owed by employers are accumulating, appears to vary according to the workplace. But all the developments and outcomes lead to the same result. First there is the loss of the customary profits, disclosed by the employer with various explanations and excuses, which appears on the agenda. Then the employer, claiming that he has no more money left, stops paying the workers their salaries or the social security dues. Then he manages to send the workers away from the workplace, with a leave without pay under the "salaried" label. Meanwhile the situation is not altered in the least by the fact that the employer might have, sometimes under the same name, other workplaces or by his having other workplaces that may be very profitable. At times raw materials, products, even basic production equipment belonging to the workplace have been known to change hands under conditions of debts and payments due. And despite the workers' and occasionally some trade unions' attempts to lay their complaints before the public eye, by addressing themselves to all the relevant, qualified, presumably responsible quarters, and through the press, this kind of situation might drag on for a prolonged period of time. And when it is all over for some of the workplaces and, in the majority of cases, at the point desired by the employer, bankruptcy is declared. By then, of course, nothing can be found with which to make

payments on worker salaries, social security dues and seniority compensations or to cover the taxes owed to the state and for SSK [Social Security Organization] premiums.

The situation of workplaces which have not yet paid billions worth of worker salaries and social security dues and seniority compensations is dragging on without any measures being taken. And even in the case of those which were declared bankrupt, after years, still no money to pay off debts to workers has been collected.

Neither does the worker who has been condemned to unemployment and starvation have any hope, any guarantee for the future. If he attempts to fend for himself, tries to find another job, since his connection with his previous job has not been severed and he is insured, he has no possibility to sign a new contract and to take another job. And in order to sever his connection with his former job he has to give up the seniority compensations his employer owes him.

Briefly, when workplaces do not yield the expected profits, unemployment is not the bitter consequence from the worker's standpoint. Employers do not even feel the need to fulfill such legal obligations as paying off their workers and shutting down their workplaces. As in the Hoover case, they can continue production in another factory; and as in the Ari case, they can even resort to the method of employing new workers in the same factory. Thus workers can be made to suffer the consequences of losses stemming from such employer errors as making the wrong investments, mismanagement and the inability to find markets.

The draft bill which it was disclosed was elaborated by the government this week to ensure that payments due to workers will have the priority in cases of bankruptcy will be in no way sufficient on its own to prevent workers from being wronged. If the question of what should have the priority could have been solved in cases of bankruptcy, most of which in our opinion are fraudulent, there would not have been such heavy losses in the amounts due to the state.

A person, or persons, invests a capital with the aim of making profits. The founding capital is a few millions, the exploitation costs run to billions while the numbers of the workers employed reach the hundreds, the thousands. If things go well sweet profits go into the pocket of the capable employer but if things go wrong losses can be unloaded on the workers by not paying them what is their due and, by a more circuitous route, by failing to pay their SSK premiums and by an even more circuitous route, on all those whose earnings are limited by failing to pay taxes. In the meantime the enterprising employer can try his luck in another field and by spiriting away his sweet profits in the direction of other investments he can thus increase his revenues. The time to take measures, to enforce the responsibilities, the legal obligations of an employer who makes an investment has come and gone. At any rate, it is necessary to establish a relation between investing and an employer's obligations, to fill the legislative gaps in that respect.

OIL INDUSTRY LEADER URGES LESS DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET IMPORTS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Aug 84 p 9

[Interview with Thordur Asgeirsson, president of Icelandic Oil; commentary by 'Staksteinar']

[Text] Gasoline Prices in Iceland

Gasoline prices in western Europe are nowhere higher than they are in Iceland. The reasons for this are twofold. In the first place, almost 60 percent of our gasoline costs are taken up by taxes which go into the national economy. In the second place, there is no competition among oil merchants (oil companies) as regards prices. Most of the gasoline which we buy comes from Russia, in accordance with special agreements which the Icelandic authorities have made with the Soviet Union. Thordur Asgeirsson, president of Icelandic Oil, in a recent interview by DAGBLADID-VISIR, answered questions about this exchange and about the price of gasoline in Iceland. Our "Staksteinar" column today reviews the highlights of this interview, in order to inform our readers about this sector of our national expenses.

No Price Wars on Gasoline Sales in Iceland

We reprint below some of the questions and answers from the DAGBLADID-VISIR interview with the president of Icelandic Oil:

[Question] Are we about to experience a gas war, like the one that has been raging in the other Nordic countries?

[Answer] As far as I am able to understand, the gas wars in Norway and Denmark have been first and foremost price wars. That couldn't happen here in Iceland, since the oil companies here don't determine anything like that--neither the prices at which Iceland buys gasoline, nor the prices at which the companies sell it.

[Question] And so we can't blame the oil companies for the high gasoline prices here, then?

[Answer] No, there is no way you could pin that one on the oil companies. The reason that gasoline prices are higher here than they are elsewhere is first and foremost that we collect more federal taxes than other countries do. The government takes in some 60 percent of our gasoline prices in taxes, plus the fact that it is more expensive to transport gasoline to Iceland than to other countries in Europe. Cost equalization also adds to the price. It has been determined by law that gasoline should be sold at the same price all over the country. This price is always determined by the Price Council.

[Question] The oil companies don't determine prices, then. Does that mean that there is no competition among the oil companies, that they cooperate with one another in a spirit of brotherhood?

[Answer] You are correct in saying that there is no competition among the oil companies as far as gasoline prices go, for the simple reason that sales prices are determined by other parties. On the other hand, you can't help noticing that there is very active competition among the oil companies for the sale of products other than gasoline, and as a result of that, there is also active competition for the sale of gasoline, even though it does not involve competitive prices. The companies compete by trying to offer the best service and by having good, attractive service stations. They also try to have a varied supply of products for sale at their service stations, products which automobile owners will need.

Monopoly Unfavorable

The interview continues as follows:

[Question] Then it wouldn't do to have just one oil company?

[Answer] That would benefit no one. It has become apparent in many cases that monopolies are not beneficial. I definitely feel that service would be much worse if there were only one company.

[Question] Currently, you and your colleagues do nothing to determine gasoline prices. Have the oil companies done anything to change this system?

[Answer] The price of gasoline is primarily determined by the purchase price, transportation costs, government taxation, and domestic operational costs. When I say that we do not determine the purchase price, what I mean is that the majority of the gasoline we bring in is bought from Russia, in accordance with agreements made between our government and the Russian oil company. These agreements are a component of the more extensive business agreements between the two nations, and up to now it has been thought necessary for our commercial well-being to buy this much gasoline from the Russians.

[Question] You are referring to the fact that this year we bought more gasoline from Portugal than we did from Russia.

[Answer] You are right. It is true that Portugal is currently the other nation that we buy the most gasoline from. Our gasoline for use in automobiles is almost entirely purchased from these two nations. The reason we bought more from Portugal this time is that the Russians have had problems getting our gasoline delivered in time to meet our demands.

[Question] The Minister of Commerce has recently said that the competition among oil companies ought to be increased, and that you and your colleagues ought to determine your portion of gasoline prices yourselves. Do you agree with this?

[Answer] I honestly can't imagine how they would begin to do that. I do agree that there ought to be competition among the oil companies, and would like to see that competition increase, but I don't see how we could increase it over what we have currently, except by giving the companies a freer hand in purchasing.

Russian Gasoline

[Question] Should we stop buying gasoline from Russia, then?

[Answer] I have made no secret of the fact that I think we ought to cut back on our gasoline purchases from the Russians, and that the oil companies ought to be granted the freedom to import their own gasoline. I think that this would improve the situation by resulting in lowered gasoline prices.

[Question] Would it be profitable to do that?

[Answer] Currently, we buy more goods from the Russians than they buy from us, and even if we stopped buying gasoline from them we would still be buying all our crude oil from them, as we always have. Crude oil has been very beneficial to us here. I also figure that we will continue to buy a significant portion of our gasoline from there. And so it would be justifiable for us to cut back on our gasoline purchases from the Russians, since we have an unfavorable balance of trade with them.

[Question] Our gasoline prices are the highest in Europe. Isn't it just too much that we also have the poorest quality gasoline?

[Answer] That's not true, that it is the poorest quality. We now have 93-octane gasoline, which is a step up from what we used to have. Several years ago, our gasoline was only 87-octane. Our gasoline here has a higher octane level than the gasoline which is called "regular" in other countries. Our gasoline here is not as good as the best gasoline abroad, but it is also better than the worst.

[Question] Why can't we have better gasoline?

[Answer] The reason for this is that we buy almost all of our gasoline from the Russians and they simply don't have anything better to offer. And also, I don't think it advisable to offer our automobile owners more than one variety of gasoline. That would be of no benefit to them.

ICELAND'S FOREIGN MINISTER ON DISPUTE WITH NORWAY, DENMARK

Greenland Economic Zone at Issue

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Aug 84 p 72

[Article: "Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson Believes that Danes and Norwegians have Made Agreement"]

[Text] "The Danes sent their fishing ships into the grey zone two or three years ago, which aggravated the Norwegian defense fleet, resulting in accidents. We believe that these two parties have come to some agreement by now as regards the avoidance of such accidents. But what the terms of the agreement are, I don't know," said Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson when a reporter from MORGUNBLADID asked his opinion on the statements made by fisherman Arni Gislason in Hirtshals in Denmark, which appeared last Saturday in MORGUNBLADID. Gislason said that the Norwegians and the Danes had made a silent agreement concerning the grey zone, that is, the area between the midline between Jan Mayen and Greenland and another borderline, located 200 miles from the coast of Greenland.

"The Danes continue to maintain that Greenland's economic jurisdiction extends as far as 200 miles in the direction of Jan Mayen," Hallgrimsson continued. "But the Norwegians have not been able to agree with this. They say that the midline between the two ought to be the border. There can be no solution to this disagreement without some kind of appeal to arbitration, which both parties could agree on. This is what the Danes have offered. But the Norwegians want to settle the matter by a simple agreement. I myself cannot see that a middle ground can be found in this case," said Hallgrimsson.

Geir Hallgrimsson told this reporter that it was clear that we Icelanders ought to keep watch on Faeroese capelin fishing in the Jan Mayen area, with an eye to our international relations in the area of fisheries, and he also mentioned liberties they have taken in Icelandic waters. Our territorial waters guards in their inspection flight yesterday spotted one Faeroese ship fishing for capelin, plus three other ships, which were thought most likely to be also from the Faeroes.

Reykjavik Daily Comments

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Aug 84 p 28

[Editorial: "New Jan Mayen Dispute"]

[Text] The fishing expedition of three Danish ships into the capelin-rich waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen has brought it to our attention that it is urgent that we negotiate to make an end to the disputes arising out of this area as soon as possible. We believe that none of the parties in this dispute should find it difficult to send their respective representatives to come together and discuss the matter in a friendly manner. On the one hand, the argument centers on border disputes involving Jan Mayen and Greenland--which means that it is the Norwegians and the Danes who need to work out an agreement--but we Icelanders would like to see that our own economic interests are also looked out for, when the borderline is drawn up. On the other hand, the argument centers on setting limits on the exploitation of Iceland's capelin resources. In regard to this, the Icelanders and the Norwegians have agreed on a particular procedure, which the European Economic Community could not agree to, but its officials will set a limit for capelin fishing in Greenland's territorial waters which will be valid up to the time when Greenland leaves the EEC.

Last Friday, the Icelandic government sent protests to the Danish Foreign Ministry, to the European Economic Community, and to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, expressing dissatisfaction at the fishing activity of the Danish ships. The protest describes it as "unfair" that the EEC has unilaterally permitted that 105,000 tons of capelin may be taken from the sea in this area. The protest particularly strongly opposes the fact that the Danish ships fished east of the midline between Greenland and Jan Mayen, and also emphasizes that the Icelandic government wants the midline rule to be operative in these waters, instead of the territorial border 200 miles from the Greenlandic coast which the Danes have demanded. The argument against the 200-mile border proposed by the Danes is that there are natural resource areas that should be under Icelandic jurisdiction in the vicinity of Jan Mayen, as opposed to having them counted "resources" for Greenland's uninhabited coasts. The reason that it is logical to refer to these areas as "Icelandic natural resources" is that in the Jan Mayen agreement of 1980 the Norwegians and Icelanders agreed upon mutual use of the area. The statement sent to the Norwegians suggests that they should maintain guard over the areas stretching from Jan Mayen all the way west to the midline, since it lowers the capelin yield for the Norwegians if Danish ships fish the area.

We also need to talk about the justified protection of Icelandic natural resources on the part of the Icelandic authorities. Unfortunately, in regard to our excellent neighbors and kinsmen in Norway and Denmark we are beginning to doubt their willingness to proceed in this matter in a way that would be consistent with the way the Icelandic authorities have understood the Jan Mayen agreement. We have not seen much evidence that the Norwegians feel that we Icelanders have anything other than user's rights inside of the agreed limits in the Jan Mayen area. The Norwegians would have to consider it out of

accordance with the agreement if the Icelanders, for example, sent warships into the disputed area, with the intention of chasing the Danish fishing ships west over the midline towards Greenland. But we have not heard anything either from the Norwegians indicating that they would like to cut back their fishing yields as a result of the activity of the Danish fishing ships.

Considering that the parties in this disagreement are nations which consistently have indicated in the international arena that disputes like this one can be solved by mutual agreement, and considering that the Nordic nations have desired to set an example in the international arena of honesty, friendship and cooperation amongst themselves, we ought to raise our eyebrows at the statements by Arni Gislason, fisherman in Hirtshals, who sent ships to fish for capelin off of eastern Greenland. He said in MORGUNBLADID last Saturday that the Danes and the Norwegians have drawn up a silent agreement which indicates that Danish capelin fishing ships can fish without dispute inside of the 200-mile territorial waters line off the coast of Greenland. If what Gislason has said is correct, it is obvious that Iceland and Norway need to draw up a new Jan Mayen agreement.

The new Jan Mayen agreement, of course, will not have to do with a line between Iceland and Jan Mayen, but rather a line between Jan Mayen and Greenland. The strangest thing about the whole affair is that it seems that the Icelanders are more willing to stick their necks out to defend Norwegian natural resources than the Norwegians are themselves.

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NITRATE, PHOSPHATE WATER POLLUTANTS TARGETED

Paris AFP SCIENCES in French 26 Jul 84 p 56

[Unsigned article]

[Text] Paris--Water pollution with nitrates and phosphates demands vigorous intervention because of its effect on water bodies, rivers, and the coast, declared Huguette Bouchardeau, minister for environment, during her 25 July presentation to the Council of Ministers, of a report on the struggle against these two forms of industrial, household, and agricultural pollution.

1) Phosphate pollution is essentially localized in the Loire basin and on Leman Lake. Measures have been taken primarily in these two zones: construction of two dephosphatization stations in the Loire basin, and an overall program around Leman Lake, with the installation of conduit networks.

Moreover, in order to draw consumers' attention to these problems, the content of tripolyphosphates and substitute additives in laundry products will have to be shown on packages beginning in 1985, indicated Ms Bouchardeau.

2) In the case of nitrate pollution, which affects primarily rural areas, the objective is to assure compliance with the European standard of 50 milligrams per liter, beyond which water is no longer considered as drinkable. The measures taken are both correctional and preventive:

Correctional action, with financial support from the National Fund for Water Supply: protection of catchments, search for substitute sources, and exceptionally, denitrification;

Preventive action: protection of the most exposed bodies of water against nitrate infiltration, development of research and studies on the effects of nitrates on the environment, encouragement of other forms of fertilization, as well as information and education of farmers and the population.

All these actions are carried out in close concert with agricultural organizations and environmental protection associations.

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